Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: The finding that people vary in how they play economic games has led to the conclusion that people vary in their preference for fairness. Consequently, people have been divided into fair cooperators that make sacrifices for the good of the group and selfish free-riders that exploit the cooperation of others. This conclusion has been used to challenge evolutionary theory and economic theory and to guide social policy. We show that variation in behavior in the public-goods game is better explained by variation in understanding and that misunderstanding leads to cooperation.
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Citations
Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616 · cited 2×
“For example, is it any more natural to ask players to respond to the decisions of others when there is no strategic reason to do so (1–6), or to punish anonymous individuals that they will never interact with again (35), or to report the number they privately roll on a dice to determine their payoff (36)? Laboratory s…”
BackgroundAre people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780 · cited 7×
“Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 110(1):216–221.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAntisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z · Cited by 1,194
Conditional cooperation on three continents
Kocher, M. G., Cherry, T., Kroll, S., Netzer, R. J., & Sutter, M. (2008) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.015 · Cited by 387
The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
Burnham, T. C., & Johnson, D. D. P. (2005) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2005-0107 · Cited by 231 · cited 1×
“Such ingraining of behavior would suggest a major problem for the way in which economic games have been used to measure social preferences (38, 41, 42, 60).”
Method
Cited by
Silent disco: dancing in synchrony leads to elevated pain thresholds and social closeness
Tarr, B., Launay, J., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.02.004 · Cited by 341
The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional peer exclusion
Quan, J., Li, X., & Wang, X. (2019) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5119395 · Cited by 53
Trust within human-machine collectives depends on the perceived consensus about cooperative norms
Makovi, K., Sargsyan, A., Li, W., Bonnefon, J.-F., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-38592-5 · Cited by 36
von Schenk, A., Klockmann, V., & Köbis, N. (2025) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231194949 · Cited by 30
Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models
Tomassini, M., & Antonioni, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Physics · doi:10.3389/fphy.2020.00058 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Burton-Chellew, M. N., El Mouden, C., & West, S. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2016-01-19
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1291-1296
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2273367606
- Cited by
- 141
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 40.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Burton-Chellew, M. N., El Mouden, C., & West, S. A. (2016). Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1509740113
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