The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
Abstract
Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data.
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Individuals react in socially desirable ways to even the slightest cues indicating that someone may be watching.
“research findings generally agree that individuals react in socially desirable ways to even the slightest cues indicating that someone may be watching (Bateson et al. 2006; Boyd et al. 2010; Burnham and Johnson 2005; Haley and Fessler 2005; but cf. Northover et al. 2017).”
From Paradoxical effects of self-awareness of being observed: testing the effect of police body-worn cameras on assaults and aggression against officers (2018) · cites this paper as Burnham and Johnson 2005
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Experimental Game Theory and Behavior Genetics
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- Authors
- Burnham, T. C., & Johnson, D. D. P.
- Venue
- Analyse & Kritik
- Publisher
- Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Published
- 2005-05-01
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 113-135
- ISSN
- 0171-5860 (ISSN-L)
- 2365-9858
- OpenAlex
- W1587383510
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 32.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Analyse & Kritik (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- human cooperation, strong reciprocity, costly punishment, costly cooperation, group selection, individual selection, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, costly signaling, evolution of cooperation
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