Neural evidence that three dimensions organize mental state representation: Rationality, social impact, and valence
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: This study uses advanced functional neuroimaging analyses to test both existing and novel psychological theories about how we understand others’ minds. Analyses show that three dimensions—rationality, social impact, and valence—account for almost half of the variation in the neural representation of mental states, the most comprehensive theory to date regarding our ability to think about others’ minds. These findings both inform long-standing debates within social psychology about theory of mind and generate testable predictions about how our neural hardware supports our ability to mentalize.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundAFNI: Software for analysis and visualization of functional magnetic resonance neuroimages
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“The dimensions of these theories include valence and arousal (4, 5), warmth and competence (6, 7), agency and experience (8), emotion and reason, mind and body (9), social and nonsocial (2, 10, 11), and uniquely human and shared with animals (12).”
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“The dimensions of these theories include valence and arousal (4, 5), warmth and competence (6, 7), agency and experience (8), emotion and reason, mind and body (9), social and nonsocial (2, 10, 11), and uniquely human and shared with animals (12).”
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“Here, it derives from theories in the domain of social cognition, including primarily experience and agency (8), warmth vs.”
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“The dimensions of these theories include valence and arousal (4, 5), warmth and competence (6, 7), agency and experience (8), emotion and reason, mind and body (9), social and nonsocial (2, 10, 11), and uniquely human and shared with animals (12).”
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Self-citation
Cited by
Building a Science of Individual Differences from fMRI
Dubois, J., & Adolphs, R. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.014 · Cited by 628
Same Story, Different Story: The Neural Representation of Interpretive Frameworks
Yeshurun, Y., Swanson, S., Simony, E., Chen, J., Lazaridi, C., Honey, C. J., & Hasson, U. (2017) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797616682029 · Cited by 300
Modeling the Predictive Social Mind
Tamir, D. I., & Thornton, M. A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.12.005 · Cited by 282
Self-citationLieberman, M. D., Straccia, M. A., Meyer, M. L., Du, M., & Tan, K. M. (2019) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.12.021 · Cited by 268
The social brain automatically predicts others’ future mental states
Thornton, M. A., Weaverdyck, M. E., & Tamir, D. I. (2019) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1431-18.2018 · Cited by 76
“Sample size was determined via resampling-based power analysis using data from a previous study of similar design and content (Tamir et al., 2016).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Tamir, D. I., Thornton, M. A., Contreras, J. M., & Mitchell, J. P.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2015-11-30
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 194-199
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2187736915
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 19.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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