Cited by 182Social and Intergroup PsychologyPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentChild and Animal Learning Development

Rethinking people’s conceptions of mental life

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Weisman, Kara, Dweck, Carol S., Markman, Ellen M.·2017·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

Significance: How do ordinary people make sense of mental life? Pioneering work on the dimensions of mind perception has been widely interpreted as evidence that lay people perceive two fundamental components of mental life: experience and agency. However, using a method better suited to addressing this question, we discovered a very different conceptual structure. Our four studies consistently revealed three components of mental life—suites of capacities related to the body, the heart, and the mind—with each component encompassing related aspects of both experience and agency. This body–heart–mind framework distinguishes itself from the experience–agency framework by its clear and importantly different implications for dehumanization, moral reasoning, and other important social phenomena.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1704347114

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  • The correspondence between the Experience/Agency dimensions and phenomenality is not clear, and more recent work has found evidence for alternative structures that cut across this distinction.

    “However, the correspondence between these dimensions and phenomenality is not clear (Sytsma 2014) and more recent work has found evidence for alternative structures that cut across this distinction (e.g. Weisman et al. 2017, Malle 2019).”

    From Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models (2024) · cites this paper as Weisman et al. 2017

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Authors
Weisman, K., Dweck, C. S., & Markman, E. M.
Affiliations
Stanford University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2017-10-11
Volume
114
Issue
43
Pages
11374-11379
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2764192991
Cited by
182
References
20
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 6
FWCI
22.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
Keywords
human uniqueness, dehumanization, moral reasoning, decision-making capacity, human-animal differences
MeSH terms
Adult, Aged, Cognition, Emotions, Female, Humans, Male, Mental Processes, Middle Aged, Morals, Social Perception, Nontherapeutic Human Experimentation

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