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Cited by 88Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics in Business and EducationPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

The logic of universalization guides moral judgment

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Levine, Sydney, Kleiman-Weiner, Max, Schulz, Laura, Tenenbaum, Joshua, Cushman, Fiery·2020·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.2014505117PMC PMC7584905
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Abstract

Significance: Humans have several different ways to decide whether an action is wrong: We might ask whether it causes harm or whether it breaks a rule. Moral psychology attempts to understand the mechanisms that underlie moral judgments. Inspired by theories of “universalization” in moral philosophy, we describe a mechanism that is complementary to existing approaches, demonstrate it in both adults and children, and formalize a precise account of its cognitive mechanisms. Specifically, we show that, when making judgments in novel circumstances, people adopt moral rules that would lead to better consequences if (hypothetically) universalized. Universalization may play a key role in allowing people to construct new moral rules when confronting social dilemmas such as voting and environmental stewardship.

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  • Prompting agents to consider the universalization of their action significantly improves survival time.

    “we find that prompting agents to consider the universalization of their action [43], a process used by people when making moral judgments in social dilemmas, significantly improves survival time.”

    From Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents (2024) · cites this paper as [43]

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Authors
Levine, S., Kleiman-Weiner, M., Schulz, L., Tenenbaum, J., & Cushman, F.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138;
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
Corresponding author
  • Levine, Sydney
  • Tenenbaum, Joshua
  • Cushman, Fiery
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
Published
2020-10-02
Volume
117
Issue
42
Pages
26158-26169
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.2014505117
PMC
PMC7584905
OpenAlex
W3089414779
Cited by
88
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1
FWCI
4.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • John Templeton Foundation (Grant 61061)
  • Center for Brain Minds and Machines (NSF STC award CCF-1231216)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
moral judgment, universalization, moral reasoning, moral intuitions, children's moral judgment, rule-based reasoning, moral wrongness
MeSH terms
Adult, Child, Child, Preschool, Decision Making, Humans, Judgment, Middle Aged, Models, Psychological, Morals, Social Perception, Moral Development

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