Cited by 317Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEthics in Business and Education

Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.

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Everett, Jim A. C., Pizarro, David A., Crockett, M. J.·2016·Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Abstract

Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record

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Crossref · 10.1037/xge0000165

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  • In experiments, people who make utilitarian judgments about matters of life and death are less trusted.

    “In experiments, people who make utilitarian judgments about matters of life and death are less trusted 171 .”

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Authors
Everett, J. A. C., Pizarro, D. A., & Crockett, M. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Oxford (GB)
  • Cornell University (US)
Corresponding author
Everett, Jim A. C.
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Published
2016
Volume
145
Issue
6
Pages
772-787
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
OpenAlex
W3121353240
Cited by
317
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 8
FWCI
17.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (acceptedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Oxford University Press
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
Keywords
moral intuitions, trustworthiness, cooperation, moral perception, normative ethics
MeSH terms
Adult, Female, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Judgment, Male, Morals, Social Desirability, Intuition, Ethical Theory, Trust

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