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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Phenomenal knowledge.

Conee, Earl · 1994 · Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/00048409412345971

Cites

7 of 7 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 7 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Feigl H., 1958, The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’
  2. Lewis D., 1990, Mind and Cognition, 499
  3. Nemirow L., 1990, Mind and Cognition, 490

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Conee, E.
Affiliations
University of Rochester (US)
Corresponding author
Conee, Earl
Venue
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Published
1994-06
Volume
72
Issue
2
Pages
136-150
ISSN
  • 0004-8402 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-6828
OpenAlex
W4241896639
Cited by
160
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 4
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Keywords
phenomenal knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, epistemology of perception

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Phenomenal knowledge. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/00048409412345971
The paper
Conee, E. (1994). Phenomenal knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409412345971

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.