The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts
Abstract
A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea—I call it the phenomenal concept strategy—phenomenal concepts are importantly different from other concepts, and arguments against physicalism fatally neglect to take this difference into account. This paper divides the phenomenal concept strategy into a number of different versions, and argues that no version of the strategy is successful. The paper ends by contrasting the phenomenal concept strategy with a rival strategy—I call it the missing concept strategy. I suggest that the missing concept strategy presents a more plausible response to the issues about physicalism and experience.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?
MCGINN, C. (1989) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcviii.391.349 · Cited by 745
Loar, B. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214188 · Cited by 341
Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar, D. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001 · Cited by 191
Self-citationConee, E. (1994) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409412345971 · Cited by 160
The Epistemic View of Subjectivity
Sturgeon, S., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1994) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2940751 · Cited by 92
Cited by
Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?
Trogdon, K. (2013) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12009 · Cited by 286
Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar, D. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001 · Cited by 191
Self-citationA Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection
Elpidorou, A. (2016) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12068 · Cited by 23
Metadata
- Authors
- Stoljar, D.
- Venue
- Mind and Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-11
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 469-494
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2164224281
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 12.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.