The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Thinking is Believing
Abstract
The idea that people can entertain propositions without believing them is widespread, intuitive, and most probably false. The main goal of this essay is to argue against the claim that people can entertain a proposition without believing it. Evidence is presented demonstrating that we cannot withhold assent from any proposition we happen to consider. A model of belief fixation is then sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena. The proposed model is one where beliefs are the automatic output of a computationally null belief acquisition reflex. In short, the model holds that the mere activation of a mentally represented truth apt proposition leads to immediately believing it. The essay concludes by considering some consequences that the proposed model of belief acquisition has for our concept of rationality.
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Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116 · Cited by 5,359
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1980) · doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 · Cited by 4,682
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098 · Cited by 4,583
The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self
Steele, C. M. (1988) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60229-4 · Cited by 3,697
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094
Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.32.5.880 · Cited by 1,052
Some evidence for heightened sexual attraction under conditions of high anxiety
Dutton, D. G., & Aron, A. P. (1974) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0037031 · Cited by 934
Cited by
Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias
Mandelbaum, E. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12089 · Cited by 424
Self-citationUnconscious perceptual justification*
Berger, J., Nanay, B., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2018) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1432413 · Cited by 53
The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs
Millar, B. (2019) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2019.1676840 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Mandelbaum, E.
- Venue
- Inquiry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2013-12-16
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 55-96
- ISSN
- 0020-174X (ISSN-L)
- 1502-3923
- OpenAlex
- W2029310234
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 51.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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