Immediate affect as a basis for intuitive moral judgement: An adaptation of the affect misattribution procedure
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent intuitionist accounts have emphasised the role of immediate affective reactions in shaping moral judgement. In two studies, we adopted the affect misattribution procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; JPSP) to assess immediate affective reactions toward moral stimuli. We investigated how immediate moral affect influences guilt experiences in a moral dilemma (Study 1) and emotional reactions and the rejection decision with regard to an unfair monetary offer in the ultimatum game (Study 2). In Study 1, immediate moral affect had a significant effect on anticipated guilt. In Study 2, immediate moral affect had a direct effect on emotional reactions to the unfair offer and an indirect effect on the rejection decision. Moreover, evidence for a moderator effect of preference for intuition was obtained in both studies. Taken together, these results indicate that immediate moral affect can colour people's moral inferences and decisions, especially if they trust their intuitions.
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Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1062872 · Cited by 4,561
Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1 · Cited by 3,984 · cited 2×
“The rationalist and intuitionist accounts may best be reconciled on the background of dualsystem models of information processing (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).”
BackgroundIntegration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
Epstein, S. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.8.709 · Cited by 2,883 · cited 2×
“The rationalist and intuitionist accounts may best be reconciled on the background of dualsystem models of information processing (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).”
BackgroundThe Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620 · cited 3×
“This research has established that the footbridge dilemma involves a strong affective or intuitive component, which cannot be explained well by purely rational accounts of moral judgement (Greene et al., 2004, 2001).”
BackgroundMethodAn inkblot for attitudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement.
Payne, B. K., Cheng, C. M., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.277 · Cited by 1,371 · cited 14×
“In this research, individual differences in immediate moral affect were reliably assessed via the degree to which participants’ responses toward ambiguous target material were influenced by preceding positive and negative moral primes in the AMP (Payne et al., 2005).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAffective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity
Davidson, R. J. (2000) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.55.11.1196 · Cited by 890 · cited 1×
“Specifically, it may reflect individual differences in the activity of the limbic and paralimbic brain regions in response to emotional stimuli (Davidson, 2000), an area well known to be engaged in all different kinds of emotional processing.”
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The neural basis of implicit moral attitude—An IAT study using event-related fMRI
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“Moreover, amygdala activation was more pronounced for intense stimuli than for less-intense stimuli, suggesting that the amygdala ‘‘contributes the valence information necessary (the ‘automatic moral attitude’) to generate the IAT effect’’ (Luo et al., 2006, p. 1454).”
Background
Cited by
Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: A process dissociation approach
Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0031021 · Cited by 696
Personality and prosocial behavior: A theoretical framework and meta-analysis.
Thielmann, I., Spadaro, G., & Balliet, D. (2020) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000217 · Cited by 689
Cameron, C. D., Brown-Iannuzzi, J. L., & Payne, B. K. (2012) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868312440047 · Cited by 352
Moral dilemmas in cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making: A principled review
Christensen, J. F., & Gomila, A. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.008 · Cited by 307
Friese, M., Hofmann, W., & Schmitt, M. (2008) · European Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/10463280802556958 · Cited by 254
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hofmann, W., & Baumert, A.
- Venue
- Cognition & Emotion
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-04
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 522-535
- ISSN
- 0269-9931 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0600
- OpenAlex
- W1978658355
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 1.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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