Affective forecasting and self-rated symptoms of depression, anxiety, and hypomania: Evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Emerging research has examined individual differences in affective forecasting; however, we are aware of no published study to date linking psychopathology symptoms to affective forecasting problems. Pitting cognitive theory against depressive realism theory, we examined whether dysphoria was associated with negatively biased affective forecasts or greater accuracy. Participants (n=325) supplied predicted and actual emotional reactions for three days surrounding an emotionally evocative relational event, Valentine's Day. Predictions were made a month prior to the holiday. Consistent with cognitive theory, we found evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias-the tendency of individuals in dysphoric states to overpredict negative emotional reactions to future events. The dysphoric forecasting bias was robust across ratings of positive and negative affect, forecasts for pleasant and unpleasant scenarios, continuous and categorical operationalisations of dysphoria, and three time points of observation. Similar biases were not observed in analyses examining the independent effects of anxiety and hypomania. Findings provide empirical evidence for the long-assumed influence of depressive symptoms on future expectations. The present investigation has implications for affective forecasting studies examining information-processing constructs, decision making, and broader domains of psychopathology.
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Cites
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995) · Behaviour Research and Therapy · doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-u · Cited by 14,523
Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting.
Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. P. (1998) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.617 · Cited by 1,547
Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2005) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-843x.114.1.62 · Cited by 195 · cited 5×
“…and often overlooked step in ruling out alternative explanations, such as the possibility that observed findings are due to nonspecific stress or emotionality, rather than dysphoric symptoms in particular (B. D. Dunn et al., 2007; Gruber, Oveis, Keltner, & Johnson, 2011; Rinck & Becker, 2005).”
Influential
Cited by
Positive interventions: An emotion regulation perspective.
Quoidbach, J., Mikolajczak, M., & Gross, J. J. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0038648 · Cited by 546
Craske, M. G., Meuret, A. E., Ritz, T., Treanor, M., & Dour, H. J. (2016) · Depression and Anxiety · doi:10.1002/da.22490 · Cited by 387
“[76, 77] Also, dysphoric individuals expect to feel less positive emotions in future positive events[78, 79] and self-report less positive emotion in anticipation of a monetary reward[57] compared to healthy controls, although the evidence is not entirely robust.”
BackgroundDunn, B. D. (2012) · Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy · doi:10.1002/cpp.1799 · Cited by 168
The future is here: A review of foresight systems in anxiety and depression
Miloyan, B., Pachana, N. A., & Suddendorf, T. (2014) · Cognition and Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699931.2013.863179 · Cited by 160
Episodic foresight and anxiety: proximate and ultimate perspectives
Miloyan, B., Bulley, A., & Suddendorf, T. (2016) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjc.12080 · Cited by 92
Metadata
- Authors
- Hoerger, M., Quirk, S. W., Chapman, B. P., & Duberstein, P. R.
- Venue
- Cognition & Emotion
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-09
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1098-1106
- ISSN
- 0269-9931 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0600
- OpenAlex
- W2160281006
- Cited by
- 101
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 8.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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