The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The affective priming effect: Automatic activation of evaluative information in memory
Abstract
Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986) argued that affect may be activated automatically from memory on the mere observation of an affect-loaded stimulus. Using a variant of the standard sequential priming paradigm, it was demonstrated that the time needed to evaluate target words as positive or negative decreased if they were preceded by a similarly valenced prime word, but increased when preceded by a prime of opposite valence. Several aspects of their procedure, however, do not warrant their conclusion concerning the unconditionality of the effect. The present research investigated the generality of this affective priming effect. In Experiment 1, it was tested whether the effect can be generalised to more complex visual material. Stimulus pairs consisted of colour slides. Subjects had to evaluate the targets as quickly as possible. In Experiment 2, the standard word-word procedure was used, but target words had to be pronounced. In both experiments, significant affective priming effects were observed, supporting Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto's (1992) assertion that the automatic activation effect is a pervasive and relative unconditional phenomenon. Implications for theories of affect and emotion are discussed.
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Cites
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The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
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Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis.
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Implicit measures: A normative analysis and review.
De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0014211 · Cited by 878
On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview
Fazio, R. H. (2001) · Cognition & Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699930125908 · Cited by 641
Metadata
- Authors
- Hermans, D., Houwer, J. D., & Eelen, P.
- Venue
- Cognition & Emotion
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1994-11
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 515-533
- ISSN
- 0269-9931 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0600
- OpenAlex
- W2081382145
- Cited by
- 372
- References
- 55
- FWCI
- 8.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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