The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation
Abstract
Four experiments examined people's folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not evaluative considerations--considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame--played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people's judgments as to whether or not that behavior should be considered "intentional." After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people's concept of intentional action.
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Cites
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
Velleman, J. D., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185304 · Cited by 2,384
Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes
Churchland, P. M., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1981) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil198178268 · Cited by 1,814
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
Churchland, P. M. (1981) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025900 · Cited by 1,500
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7289.001.0001 · Cited by 1,479
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
McCann, H. J., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215590 · Cited by 1,472
Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory
GOPNIK, A., & WELLMAN, H. M. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00202.x · Cited by 1,158
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-6547 · Cited by 1,132
The attribution of blame : causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness
Shaver, K. G. (1985) · Cited by 800
The Folk Concept of Intentionality
Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314 · Cited by 742
Self-citationShaver, K. G. (1985) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-5094-4 · Cited by 674
Cited by
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm
Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x · Cited by 1,013
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x · Cited by 558
Self-citationSurveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2009) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/a0015960 · Cited by 466
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Metadata
- Authors
- Knobe, J.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2003-06
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 309-324
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2120555093
- Cited by
- 447
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 4.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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