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The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm

Cushman, Fiery, Young, Liane, Hauser, Marc·2006·Psychological Science

Abstract

Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.

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Metadata

Authors
Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M.
Venue
Psychological Science
Published
2006-12
Volume
17
Issue
12
Pages
1082-1089
ISSN
  • 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9280
OpenAlex
W2168401869
Cited by
1,013
References
26
FWCI
15.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x
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Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x

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