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Are philosophers expert intuiters?

Weinberg, Jonathan M., Gonnerman, Chad, Buckner, Cameron, Alexander, Joshua · 2010 · Philosophical Psychology

Abstract

Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers’ reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers’ training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with good reason to endorse this key empirical premise of the expertise defense.

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Metadata

Authors
Weinberg, J. M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C., & Alexander, J.
Venue
Philosophical Psychology
Published
2010-06
Volume
23
Issue
3
Pages
331-355
ISSN
  • 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-394X
OpenAlex
W1977539885
Cited by
246
References
9
FWCI
123.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Are philosophers expert intuiters? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/09515089.2010.490944
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Weinberg, J. M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C., & Alexander, J. (2010). Are philosophers expert intuiters? Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.490944

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