The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are philosophers expert intuiters?
Abstract
Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers’ reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers’ training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with good reason to endorse this key empirical premise of the expertise defense.
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Citations
Cites
The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Römer, C. (1993) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.100.3.363 · Cited by 9,564
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2 · Cited by 4,479
Acquisition of cognitive skill
Anderson, J. R. (1982) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.89.4.369 · Cited by 3,663 · cited 2×
“Much of the literature on expertise concerns not just factual competences but procedural ones (e.g., Anderson, 1982).”
EXPERT AND EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE: Evidence of Maximal Adaptation to Task Constraints
Ericsson, K. A., & Lehmann, A. C. (1996) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.47.1.273 · Cited by 2,139
Ericsson, K. A. (2006) · The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816796.038 · Cited by 1,629
Children and adults as intuitive scientists.
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Curvilinear Motion in the Absence of External Forces: Naïve Beliefs About the Motion of Objects
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Why study expert decision making? Some historical perspectives and comments
Shanteau, J., & Stewart, T. R. (1992) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(92)90057-e · Cited by 173
Cited by
SCHWITZGEBEL, E., & CUSHMAN, F. (2012) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x · Cited by 391
Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection
Schwitzgebel, E., & Cushman, F. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015 · Cited by 314
Lay beliefs in moral expertise
Schmittat, S. M., & Burgmer, P. (2020) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1719053 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Weinberg, J. M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C., & Alexander, J.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-06
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 331-355
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W1977539885
- Cited by
- 246
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 123.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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