An explanation of the hard-easy effect in studies of realism of confidence in one's general knowledge
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent ecological approaches to realism of confidence in general knowledge (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinbolting, 1991; Juslin, in press) argue that people are well-calibrated to their natural environments. Both the overconfidence phenomenon and the hard-easy effect are explained as consequences of informal experimenter-guided selection of almanac items, selection that changes the validity of the cues used by the subjects for selection of answers to the items. The paper presents the ecological approach and reports an experiment showing that: (1) when the objects of judgement are selected randomly from a natural environment, people are well-calibrated; (2) when more and less difficult item samples are created by selecting items with more and less familiar contents, i.e. in a way that does not affect the validity of the cues, no hard-easy effect is observed, and people are well-calibrated both for hard and easy item samples. These results, predicted by the ecological approach, provide further support for the ecological approach to realism of confidence.
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Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980
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Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506
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Cited by
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
“…existing process theory of the overconfidence bias that successfully predicts conditions under which overestimation occurs, disappears, and inverts to underestimation (Gigerenzer, 1993; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1993, 1994; Juslin, Winman, & Persson, 1995; but see Griffin & Tversky, 1992).”
BackgroundThe misunderstood limits of folk science: An illusion of explanatory depth
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1 · Cited by 1,032
Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask
Klayman, J., Soll, J. B., González-Vallejo, C., & Barlas, S. (1999) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1999.2847 · Cited by 785
Overconfidence in Interval Estimates.
Soll, J. B., & Klayman, J. (2004) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.30.2.299 · Cited by 493
Metadata
- Authors
- Juslin, P.
- Venue
- European Journal of Cognitive Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1993-03
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 55-71
- ISSN
- 0954-1446 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0635
- OpenAlex
- W1991572094
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 2.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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