Intuition: A Challenge for Psychological Research on Decision Making
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Intuition represents an enormous challenge for research on decision making. What is intuition? How does it modify our appreciation of cognitive abilities? When should people trust intuition? These questions set the agenda for this article, which (a) defines intuition, (b) comments on how intuition has been viewed across time in the decision making literature, (c) stresses the need to specify different types of intuition, (d) discusses when intuition is likely to lead to good decisions, and (e) presents four challenges. These are, first, elucidating the evolution of preferences; second, illuminating culturally acquired values such as morals; third, the need to educate intuitive responses; and fourth, problems in using intuition for decision making in a changing world. However, the major challenge facing intuition research is the need for conceptual work to define the nature and scope of different intuitive phenomena. To be useful, the concept should not become too broad.
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Citations
Cites
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A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Simon, H. A. (1955) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884852 · Cited by 15,877
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Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 · Cited by 8,094 · cited 2×
“As Zajonc (1980) elegantly argued, “preferences need no inferences” in that many objects (or situations) are immediately classified on a “liking” scale without conscious effort.”
BackgroundThe emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure
Zajonc, R. B. (1968) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0025848 · Cited by 6,745
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“Similarly, chess masters, who have experienced many thousands of different situations, demonstrate effective pattern recognition skills when confronted with new challenges (see, eg, Chase & Simon, 1973 ).”
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476 · cited 1×
“…(i.e., without conscious awareness of the process) make judgments that experiments have shown to be consistent with specific heuristics (cf. Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).6 To the extent that these heuristics represent intuitive judgment, it can be argued that intuition is flawed (when the…”
BackgroundIntegration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
Epstein, S. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.8.709 · Cited by 2,883 · cited 8×
“As noted, this provides a useful distinction between judgments or actions that can be thought of as being intuitive or analytic in nature and has helped to illuminate many phenomena (Epstein, 1994). Yet, if one pushes the dual process idea further and, in particular, starts to look deeper into nonconscious and automat…”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review
Newell, B. R., & Shanks, D. R. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12003214 · Cited by 652
Petsolari, M., Ibrahim, S. B., & Slovak, P. (2024) · Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3613904.3642619 · Cited by 35
“Parents face numerous decisions when it comes to caring for their child’s well-being (e.g., deciding how, when, and where to seek support; which parenting strategies to use) [69, 167, 242].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Hogarth, R. M.
- Venue
- Psychological Inquiry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-11-30
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 338-353
- ISSN
- 1047-840X (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7965
- OpenAlex
- W2051190588
- Cited by
- 245
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 6.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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