The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The principal-agent approach and the study of the European Union: promise unfulfilled?
Abstract
The principal-agent model holds great promise for understanding the institutional complexities of the EU and for moving beyond the sterile debate between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. As yet, however, scholars have failed to exploit the insights that this construct affords. After a brief discussion of the principal-agent model, this article offers a critical examination of the way that the principal-agent approach has been deployed by liberal intergovernmentalism, institutional intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalist supranationalism, and rational-choice supranationalism. It argues that, in all four cases, the a priori commitments of the theorists, in support either of the view that the member states effectively control their supranational agents and dominate EU governance or of the belief in an inevitable trend towards greater integration, led by supranational institutions, prevent them from making the most effective use of the model. It proposes alternative applications that may prove more fruitful.
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Cites
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Cited by
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
Central banking and inequalities: Taking off the blinders
Fontan, C., Claveau, F., & Dietsch, P. (2016) · Politics, Philosophy & Economics · doi:10.1177/1470594x16651056 · Cited by 62
Metadata
- Venue
- Journal of European Public Policy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2003-03-01
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 121-139
- ISSN
- 1350-1763 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-4429
- OpenAlex
- W2147804011
- Cited by
- 366
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 93.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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