CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 6,796Political Science Research and EducationQualitative Comparative Analysis ResearchEconomic Theory and Institutions

Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms

Open access
Hall, Peter A., Taylor, Rosemary C. R.·1996·Political Studies
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

1 Introduction 2 Historical Institutionalism 3 Rational Choice Institutionalism 4 Sociological Institutionalism 5 Comparing Institutionalisms 6 Conclusion 7 Notes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x

Cites

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

No references could be resolved yet.

Research works printed but not linked: 75

  1. Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Fi- nancing the Modern State (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993).
  2. Margaret Weir, 'Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation' in Steinmo et al., op. cit. in note 2, pp. 188-216.
  3. Cf. David Collier and Ruth Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991);
  4. M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1992); and Stephen Krasner, 'Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspec- tive,' Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), pp. 66-94.
  5. See Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, 'State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United States' in Peter B. Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 107-163.
  6. Cf. Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994) and 'When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change,' World Politics 45, 4 (July 1993), pp. 595-628;
  7. Jane Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse: Protective Legislation in France and the United States Before 1914,' Canadian Journal of Political Science 22, 2 (June 1989), pp. 235-258;
  8. Cf. James March and Johan Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Fac- tors in Political Life,' American Political Science Review 78 (Sept. 1984), pp. 734-749
  9. and Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
  10. Cf. Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics In Hard Times (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986);
  11. David Collier and Ruth Collier, op. cit. in note 23, and Stephen Krasner, 'Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,' Com- parative Politics 16, 2 (January, 1984), pp. 223-46.
  12. This issue deserves fuller examination than scholars have yet given it. For one view, see: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979).
  13. See: Judith Goldstein, 'Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy,' International Organization 42, 1 (1988), pp. 179-217: Margaret Weir, 'Ideas and Politics: The Ac- ceptance of Keynesianism in Britain and the United States' in Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 53- 86;
  14. Kathryn S. Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991 30 The seminal work is: William Riker, 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Ma- jority Rule for the Study of Institutions,' American Political Science Review 74 (1980), pp. 432-447. See also: Richard McCelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Vot- ing Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control,' Journal of Economic Theory 12 (1976), pp. 472-482; and John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, 'Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior,' American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 65 (1975), pp. 407-415.
  15. Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions' in Her- bert F. Weisberg (ed.), Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York, Agathon, 1986), pp. 51-81; and Shepsle, 'Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Ra- tional Choice Approach,' Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 2 (1989), pp. 131-147.
  16. Cf. Barry Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Con- gress,' Journal of Political Economy 96, 1 (1988), pp. 132-163.
  17. Two of the seminal articles are: Terry Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization,' American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984), pp. 739-777; and Weingast and Mar- shall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress,' op. cit. in note 32.
  18. Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York, Free Press, 1975) and Wil- liamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, Free Press, 1985).
  19. Cf. Douglass C. North and Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1973).
  20. John W. Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents (Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1991).
  21. Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (eds.), Congress: Structure and Policy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Legislative Studies Quarterly (May 1994).
  22. Gary Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987);
  23. John Ferejohn, 'Law, Legislation and Positive Political The- ory' in Banks and Hanushek, Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions (New York, Cambridge University Press), pp. 191-215;
  24. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, 'Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions,' Legislative Stud- ies Quarterly (May 1994);
  25. Terry Moe, 'An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Con- gressional Dominance,' Legislative Studies Quarterly 12, 4 (1987), pp. 475-520;
  26. Mat- thew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Po- lice Patrols versus Fire Alarms,' American Journal of Political Science 28 (February 1984), pp. 165-179.
  27. Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, 'Coalitions and Cabinet Government,' American Political Science Review 84 (1990), pp. 843-890;
  28. Douglass C. North and Barry Wein- gast, 'Constitutions and Credible Commitments: The Evolution of Institutions Gov- erning Public Choice in 17th Century England,' Journal of Economic History 49 (December 1989), pp. 803-832;
  29. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991);
  30. Barbara Geddes, Politicians' Dilemma (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994);
  31. Gary Marks, 'Rational Sources of Chaos in Democratic Transitions,' American Behavioral Scientist 33 4/5 (1992), pp. 397-421;
  32. Youssef Cohen, Radicals, Re- formers and Reactionaries (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1994);
  33. James deNardo, Power in Numbers (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985).
  34. George Tsebelis, 'The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter,' American Political Science Review 88, 1 (1994), pp. 795-815;
  35. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, 'Delegation to International Organizations.' Paper presented to a conference on 'What is Institutionalism Now?,' University of Maryland, 1994;
  36. Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power and Multilateralism,' International Or- ganization 46, 4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 765-792;
  37. Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993);
  38. Stephen Krasner, 'Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,' World Politics 43 (April 1991), pp. 336-366.
  39. Cf. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Commit- tee Power,' American Political Science Review 81 (March 1987), pp. 85-104; cf. Jon El- ster and Aanund Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986).
  40. Cf. G. Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons,' Science 162 (1968), pp. 1243-1248;
  41. Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1982); Elinor Os- trom, Governing the Commons (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
  42. Cf. Williamson, Market and Hierarchies (New York, Free Press, 1975), and Milgrom and Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management; and Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, 'Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Ac- tivity' in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Econ- omy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 57-89.
  43. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1991); cf. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995).
  44. For amplification of these points, see: Frank Dobbin, 'Cultural Models of Organiza- tion: The Social Construction of Rational Organizing Principles' in Diana Crane (ed.), The Sociology of Culture (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), pp. 117-153.
  45. The pioneering work was done by Stanford sociologists. See: John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, 'Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Cere- mony,' American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977), pp. 340-363;
  46. and Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, 'Introduction' in Powell and DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, University of Chi- cago Press, 1991), pp. 1-40.
  47. Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994).
  48. Marco Orru et al., 'Organizational Isomorphism in East Asia' in Powell and DiMag- gio (eds.), pp. 361-389 and Robert E. Cole, Strategies for Industry: Small-Group Activi- ties in American, Japanese and Swedish Industry (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989).
  49. Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1990);
  50. Yasemin N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship (Chicago, University of Chi- cago Press, 1994).
  51. Cf. John L. Campbell, 'Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Econ- omy.' Paper presented to the Seminar on the State and Capitalism since 1800, Har- vard University, 1995; and W. Richard Scott, 'Institutions and Organizations: To- wards a Theoretical Synthesis' in W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer et al., Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (Thousand Oaks CA, Sage, 1994), pp. 55-80.
  52. Cf. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston, Little Brown, 1963) and Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy (Oxford, Polity, 1986), ch. 1.
  53. Cf. Lynne Zucker, 'The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence' in Powell and DiMaggio (eds.), op. cit. in note 49, pp. 83-107;
  54. Cf. Ann Swidler, 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,' American Sociological Review 51 (1986), pp. 273-286 and James March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering In- stitutions (New York, The Free Press, 1989), ch. 3.
  55. See the classic work by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, Anchor, 1966) and the more recent application to political sci- ence by Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,' International Organization 41, 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370.
  56. Cf. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, 'Introduction' in Powell and DiMaggio, op. cit. in note 49, pp. 22-24 and the essays by Lynne G. Zucker and Ronald Jepper- son in that volume.
  57. C.f. Campbell, 'Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' op. cit. in note 54, and James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York, Free Press, 1989), ch. 2. 62 Fligstein, op. cit. in note 53. 63 Soysal, op. cit. in note 53.
  58. For more extended discussions, see: Karen S. Cook and Margaret Levi (eds.), The Limits of Rationality (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Jane Mans- bridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990).
  59. We are grateful for Kenneth Shepsle for drawing this to our attention. Cf. Milton Friedman, 'The Methodology of Positive Economics,' in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953).
  60. The problem is magnified by the fact that many equilibrium solutions may be pres- ent in a given situation, as the 'folk theorem' suggests. More generally, see: Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994).
  61. This is a point made in Robert Bates, 'Contra-Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism,' Politics and Society 16 (1987), pp. 387-401.
  62. For a powerful effort to tackle this problem without entirely foresaking rational choice assumptions, see: Terry Moe, 'The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy' in Oliver Williamson (ed.), Organization Theory from Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York, Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116-153.
  63. For one example, see the otherwise valuable analysis in: Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, op. cit in note 39. Similarly, it may be that many rational choice analyses assume too readily that the presence of collective action problems will gen- erate an automatic 'demand' for new institutions. For correctives, see: Bates, 'Contra- Contractarianism', op. cit. in note 71, and Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
  64. See Bates, op. cit. in note 71, and Robert Grafstein, Institutional Realism: Social and Po- litical Constraints on Rational Actors (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), ch. 3.
  65. For an astute analysis that attempts to build an appreciation for asymmetries of power into a rational choice theory of institutional creation, see: David Knight, Insti- tutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). This can be a problem even in legislatures, where majorities can often enforce institutional change on minorities, as studies of party government are beginning to emphasize. See: Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Govern- ment in the House (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994).
  66. Although some scholars have argued that competition among nation-states or politi- cal elites tends to select for some kinds of institutions over others, surprisingly little research has been done on this problem. Cf. Thomas Ertman, Pioneers and Latecomers (New York, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Hilton Root, Fountain of Privilege (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994);
  67. W. G. Runciman, A Treatise in Social Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984); and more generally: Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, op. cit. in note 75, ch. 1 and Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
  68. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, 'Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony', in John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott et al., Organisational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Newbury Park, Sage, 1992), pp. 21-44; and
  69. For some exceptional works that pay more attention to this dimension of institu- tionalization, see: Paul J. DiMaggio, 'Constructing an Organizational Field as a Pro- fessional Project' in Powell and DiMaggio, op. cit. in note 49, pp. 267-292; Fligstein, op. cit in note 53, and Lauren Edelman, 'Legal Environments and Organizational Governance,' American Journal of Sociology 95 (1990), 1401-1440.
  70. Cf. Peter Swenson, 'Bringing Capital Back In or Social Democracy Reconsidered,' World Politics 43, 4 (1991), pp. 513-544, and Bo Rothstein, 'Explaining Swedish Cor- poratism: The Formative Moment,' Scandinavian Political Studies 14, 2 (1991), pp. 149- 171.
  71. For more on this example, see Hall, op. cit. in note 8, pp. 247-248.
  72. David Kreps, 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,' in Alt and Shepsle, Perspec- tives on Positive Political Economy, pp. 90-143.
  73. Cf. Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast 'Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Construct- ing the European Community's Internal Market' in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 173-206, and Stephen Krasner, op. cit. in note 42.
  74. Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices,' Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 2 (1989), pp. 149-176. We can read much the same argument into Robert Putnam's contention that those regions of Italy with significant past ex- per-ience of cooperative collective association provided more fertile ground for col- lective endeavor, even centuries later, than regions without that experience. Cf. Put- nam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993).
  75. Barry Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law' (forthcoming); and John A. Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpreta- tion: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England' in Kristen R. Monroe (ed.), The Economic Approach to Politics (New York, Harper Collins, 1991).

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Tufts University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Political Studies
Publisher
SAGE Publications
Published
1996-12
Volume
44
Issue
5
Pages
936-957
ISSN
  • 0032-3217 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9248
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x
OpenAlex
W1561018600
Cited by
6,796
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 234 · 2025: 219 · 2024: 241 · 2023: 319 · 2022: 296 · 2021: 322 · 2020: 375 · 2019: 363 · 2018: 391 · 2017: 329 · 2016: 293 · 2015: 272 · 2014: 297 · 2013: 281 · 2012: 293
FWCI
193.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Political Studies (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • Fachinformationen für Politikwissenschaft, Verwaltungswissenschaft und Kommunalwissenschaften (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik) (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Science Research and Education
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
new institutionalism, historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, behaviouralism

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review