Belief bias in informal reasoning
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal reasoning tasks: the Argument Evaluation Task (AET) and a Law of Large Numbers (LLN) task in order to test the similarity of the phenomena concerned. Our findings provide little support for the idea that belief bias on formal and informal reasoning is a unitary phenomenon. First, there was no correlation across individuals in the extent of belief bias shown on the three tasks. Second, evidence for belief by strength interaction was observed only on AET and under conditions not required for the comparable finding on syllogistic reasoning. Finally, we found that while conclusion believability strongly influenced assessments of arguments strength, it had a relatively weak influence on the verbal justifications offered on the two informal reasoning tasks.
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Citations
Cites
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Self-citationThe Logic of Scientific Discovery
Popper, K. R., & Weiss, G. (1959) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3060577 · Cited by 2,717
Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (1974) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(74)90017-1 · Cited by 575
Self-citationExplaining modulation of reasoning by belief
Goel, V., & Dolan, R. J. (2003) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(02)00185-3 · Cited by 442 · cited 2×
“Such an interpretation is consistent with the neural imaging evidence of conflict detection and resolution within this paradigm (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Tsujii & Watanabee, 2009).”
ResultThe Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic Reasoning
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0696 · Cited by 324 · cited 2×
“…on the other hand, comprehending and representing the unfamiliar premises arguably requires more effort, even assuming that participants make only a single representation of them (Evans et al., 1999; Thompson et al., 2003) or default to a heuristic to make their decision (Chater & Oaksford, 1999).”
BackgroundWorking memory and bias in reasoning across the life span
Gilinsky, A. S., & Judd, B. B. (1994) · Psychology and Aging · doi:10.1037/0882-7974.9.3.356 · Cited by 138 · cited 2×
“However, an increase in belief bias in older adults has also been recorded with the syllogistic paradigm (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994) and subsequent studies on LLN tasks have found a reliable belief bias in young adult groups as well (Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Neilens, Handley, & Newstead, 2009).”
Background
Cited by
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures.
Patil, I., Zucchelli, M. M., Kool, W., Campbell, S., Fornasier, F., Calò, M., Silani, G., Cikara, M., & Cushman, F. (2021) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspp0000281 · Cited by 133
Curley, L. J., Munro, J., & Dror, I. E. (2022) · Medicine, Science and the Law · doi:10.1177/00258024221080655 · Cited by 80
Metadata
- Authors
- Thompson, V., & Evans, J. S. B. T.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-06-11
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 278-310
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2066164253
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 2.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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