The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning
Abstract
I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed that A: Type 2 processes serve to rationalise and support intuitive choices. For most of its history, however, such accounts have emphasised instead B: Type 2 processes reason to conclusions or decisions. B is part of the “received theory” of dual processing, often inaccurately linked to the idea that Type 2 reasoning is necessary for correct solutions. While not mutually exclusive, the evidence for each proposition is assessed. I then present a default-interventionist model which incorporates both propositions A and B. This is consistent with evidence that reasoning to support the default intuition is the norm, although intervention may also occur. Other issues discussed include (1) whether we should treat Type 2 as well as Type 1 processing as originating from multiple systems, (2) whether we need to separate postulate “Type 3” processes to explain underlying cognitive control and attention switching, and (3) whether recent experimental observations of “logical intuitions” undermine the default-interventionist approach. I point to some new directions in which research on dual processes may proceed.
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Cites
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.2.127 · Cited by 7,335
Controlled and automatic human information processing: I. Detection, search, and attention.
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.1.1 · Cited by 5,902 · cited 1×
“However, the latter has an important part to play in training, as we have to practise the correct rules in order to automate them, an idea with a long history in cognitive psychology (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).”
BackgroundCognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Cosmides, L. (1989) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90023-1 · Cited by 2,471
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Stanovich, K. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001 · Cited by 1,041
Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (1974) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(74)90017-1 · Cited by 575
Self-citationAn evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning
Osman, M. (2004) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196730 · Cited by 444
Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief
Goel, V., & Dolan, R. J. (2003) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(02)00185-3 · Cited by 442 · cited 1×
“For example, when problems are pragmatically rich, involving beliefs, neural imaging studies show that quite different brain regions are activated than during abstract reasoning (Goel & Dolan, 2003).”
Background
Cited by
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
Hou, C., Zhu, G., & Sudarshan, V. (2025) · British Journal of Educational Technology · doi:10.1111/bjet.13613 · Cited by 72
Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. S. B. T.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2019-07-16
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 383-415
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2957627306
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 11.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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