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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 104 of the 106 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 137 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms' competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature

Open access
Joltreau, Eugénie, Sommerfeld, Katrin · 2019 · Climate Policy

Abstract

Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms’ competitiveness or profitability. For the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) the empirical literature documents that significant emissions reductions have resulted from it. Surprisingly, however, the literature shows that there have been hardly any concurrent negative effects on firms’ competitiveness during the first two phases of the scheme (2005–2012). We show that the main explanations for the absence of negative impacts on competitiveness are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may have limited the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. Several factors suggest that over-allocation is likely to remain substantial in the upcoming periods of the scheme. Therefore, we expect to see no negative competitiveness effects from the EU ETS in Phases III and IV (2013–2030).Key policy insights Empirical literature on the EU ETS shows that there have been hardly any effects on firms’ competitiveness or profitability.One main explanation is a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop. This reduced incentives for innovation.Moreover, firms were able to pass costs on to consumers in some sectors which partly generated windfall profits.Innovation effects have so far been small but positive.We expect to see no negative competitiveness effects on regulated firms in the near future suggesting that no further reliefs for regulated firms are required.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This paper is a literature-based explanation for why the EU ETS had little to no negative effect on firms’ competitiveness in Phases I–II. It argues that free allocation, over-allocation, cost pass-through, low energy cost shares, and limited but positive innovation effects together offset the expected cost burden.

## Key findings

  • The empirical literature reviewed in the paper finds “hardly any” negative competitiveness or profitability effects for EU ETS-regulated firms during Phases I and II; the paper says there is “no significant negative effects” on firm-level competitiveness.
  • In Phase I, auctioning was very limited: the European Commission allowed member states to auction a maximum of 5% of allowances in Phase I and up to 10% in Phase II, while auctioning accounted for an annual average of 0.13% of certified emissions in Phase I.
  • The paper reports a surplus of 95 million tonnes CO2 in 2005, equal to 4.5% of allocated allowances, and later says Phase III still had a surplus of 1.7 billion permits, “almost one year of EU ETS emissions.”
  • Cost pass-through was substantial in some sectors: the paper cites empirical pass-through rates of 80% in Spain (2004–2006), 60%–117% in Germany, and 64%–81% in the Netherlands for electricity, and notes refining industry pass-through of about 100%.
  • Energy costs were relatively small on average: the European Commission estimate cited in the paper puts energy costs at 4.6% of total production in the EU-27 in 2011; for manufacturing value added, it cites about 10%.
  • Innovation effects exist but are modest: the paper reports that Calel and Dechezleprêtre found the EU ETS boosted low-carbon patenting by 36.2% among matched regulated firms, but only 8.1% when extrapolated to the full non-matched sample, and that the EU ETS accounted for only 1% of the overall surge in low-carbon patenting.

## Methods

  • The paper is a narrative literature review / synthesis of ex post empirical studies on the EU ETS, focused on firm-level competitiveness rather than country-level effects.
  • It organizes the evidence around five hypotheses for the zero competitiveness effect: free allocation, over-allocation, cost pass-through, low energy-cost shares, and innovation.
  • The main analysis is comparative and explanatory: it collects and interprets findings from prior empirical papers, reports sectoral and country examples, and links them to EU ETS design features across Phases I–IV.

## Limitations

  • The paper itself states it is limited to competitiveness at the firm level, excluding the country-level perspective; it also says indirect effects such as through electricity prices are covered only briefly, and it is not a full cost–benefit analysis.
  • The paper notes that for several channels—especially carbon leakage, firm closure, and between-markets relocation—there is “a lack of research” or “scarce evidence,” which limits what can be concluded from the literature.
  • Evident from the text: the paper’s conclusions for Phases III and IV are largely prospective, because it says there is “as yet no comprehensive ex post evidence” for those phases.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/14693062.2018.1502145

Cites

104 of 106 references verified2 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Claims the paper makes

8 Valid · 12 Not valid · 106 Not checked · 92 Own results and interpretations

77 more claims · 1 with their cited sources checked

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Citations

Cites

Show all 104 references

Research works printed but not linked: 18

  1. Alberola, E., Afriat, M., Cail, S., Cassisa, S., Coussy, P., Dahan, L. … Vaidyula, M. (2015). Carbon pricing and carbon leakage issues in Phase IV of the EU ETS, Chapter 3. In Exploring the EU ETS beyond 2020: A first assessment of the EU Commission’s proposal for Phase IV of the EU ETS (2021-2030). Retrieved from https://www.i4ce.org/download/copec-report/?wpdmdl=11830
  2. Borghesi S., 2012, Giornale degli Economisti et Annali die Economia, 71, 71
  3. Brockmann K. L., 2012, Kfw/ ZEW CO2 Barometer 2012, Anreizwirkung des EU-Emissionshandels auf Unternehmen gering – Klimapolitische Regulierung wenig relevant für Standortentscheidungen
  4. 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vo132-No4-3 · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vo132-no4-3
  5. Detken A., 2009, Kfw/ZEW CO2 barometer 2009, leaving the trial phase behind – preferences & strategies of German companies under the EU ETS
  6. Elsworth R., 2011, Carbon fat cats 2011: The companies profiting from the EU emissions trading scheme
  7. EU Commission. (2015a). Report from the commission to the European parliament and the council. Climate action progress report, including the report on the functioning of the European carbon market and the report on the review of Directive 2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide. Brussels, COM(2015) 576.
  8. 10.2834/6083 · doi:10.2834/6083
  9. 10.2800/472636 · doi:10.2800/472636
  10. 10.2800/71685 · doi:10.2800/71685
  11. 10.2800/425306 · doi:10.2800/425306
  12. Gallier C., 2015, Kfw/ZEW CO2 barometer 2015 – carbon edition: Ten years of emissions trading – strategies of German companies
  13. Löschel A., 2013, Kfw/ZEW CO2 barometer 2013 – carbon edition, The EU emission trading scheme: Firm behavior during the crisis
  14. Löschel A., 2010, Kfw/ZEW CO2 barometer 2010, Effizienzpotenziale des Emissionshandels noch nicht ausgeschöpft – Strategien und Management deutscher Unternehmen
  15. Martin R., 2013, Annual meetings of the American economic association
  16. Morris D., 2010, Carbon fat cats 2009: Company analysis of the EU ETS
  17. Schleich J., 2005, Proceedings of the 2005 ECEEE summer study – what works and who delivers
  18. Wagner U. J., 2014, Fifth world congress of environmental and resources economists

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Joltreau, E., & Sommerfeld, K.
Affiliations
  • Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (FR)
  • Centre for European Economic Research (DE)
Corresponding author
Sommerfeld, Katrin
Venue
Climate Policy
Published
2018-07-26
Volume
19
Issue
4
Pages
453-471
ISSN
  • 1469-3062 (ISSN-L)
  • 1752-7457
OpenAlex
W2884154095
Cited by
183
References
104
Citations by year
2026: 25 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3
FWCI
17.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Climate Policy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Centre for European Economic Research
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Law › EU Law and Policy Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
Keywords
EU Emissions Trading System, emissions trading, enterprise competitiveness, profitability, cost pass-through, windfall profits, innovation impact, energy costs, manufacturing industry

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms' competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/14693062.2018.1502145
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Joltreau, E., & Sommerfeld, K. (2019). Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms' competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature. Climate Policy. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2018.1502145

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