The DOI matches its Crossref record; 104 of the 106 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 137 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms' competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature
Open accessAbstract
Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms’ competitiveness or profitability. For the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) the empirical literature documents that significant emissions reductions have resulted from it. Surprisingly, however, the literature shows that there have been hardly any concurrent negative effects on firms’ competitiveness during the first two phases of the scheme (2005–2012). We show that the main explanations for the absence of negative impacts on competitiveness are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may have limited the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. Several factors suggest that over-allocation is likely to remain substantial in the upcoming periods of the scheme. Therefore, we expect to see no negative competitiveness effects from the EU ETS in Phases III and IV (2013–2030).Key policy insights Empirical literature on the EU ETS shows that there have been hardly any effects on firms’ competitiveness or profitability.One main explanation is a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop. This reduced incentives for innovation.Moreover, firms were able to pass costs on to consumers in some sectors which partly generated windfall profits.Innovation effects have so far been small but positive.We expect to see no negative competitiveness effects on regulated firms in the near future suggesting that no further reliefs for regulated firms are required.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This paper is a literature-based explanation for why the EU ETS had little to no negative effect on firms’ competitiveness in Phases I–II. It argues that free allocation, over-allocation, cost pass-through, low energy cost shares, and limited but positive innovation effects together offset the expected cost burden.
## Key findings
- The empirical literature reviewed in the paper finds “hardly any” negative competitiveness or profitability effects for EU ETS-regulated firms during Phases I and II; the paper says there is “no significant negative effects” on firm-level competitiveness.
- In Phase I, auctioning was very limited: the European Commission allowed member states to auction a maximum of 5% of allowances in Phase I and up to 10% in Phase II, while auctioning accounted for an annual average of 0.13% of certified emissions in Phase I.
- The paper reports a surplus of 95 million tonnes CO2 in 2005, equal to 4.5% of allocated allowances, and later says Phase III still had a surplus of 1.7 billion permits, “almost one year of EU ETS emissions.”
- Cost pass-through was substantial in some sectors: the paper cites empirical pass-through rates of 80% in Spain (2004–2006), 60%–117% in Germany, and 64%–81% in the Netherlands for electricity, and notes refining industry pass-through of about 100%.
- Energy costs were relatively small on average: the European Commission estimate cited in the paper puts energy costs at 4.6% of total production in the EU-27 in 2011; for manufacturing value added, it cites about 10%.
- Innovation effects exist but are modest: the paper reports that Calel and Dechezleprêtre found the EU ETS boosted low-carbon patenting by 36.2% among matched regulated firms, but only 8.1% when extrapolated to the full non-matched sample, and that the EU ETS accounted for only 1% of the overall surge in low-carbon patenting.
## Methods
- The paper is a narrative literature review / synthesis of ex post empirical studies on the EU ETS, focused on firm-level competitiveness rather than country-level effects.
- It organizes the evidence around five hypotheses for the zero competitiveness effect: free allocation, over-allocation, cost pass-through, low energy-cost shares, and innovation.
- The main analysis is comparative and explanatory: it collects and interprets findings from prior empirical papers, reports sectoral and country examples, and links them to EU ETS design features across Phases I–IV.
## Limitations
- The paper itself states it is limited to competitiveness at the firm level, excluding the country-level perspective; it also says indirect effects such as through electricity prices are covered only briefly, and it is not a full cost–benefit analysis.
- The paper notes that for several channels—especially carbon leakage, firm closure, and between-markets relocation—there is “a lack of research” or “scarce evidence,” which limits what can be concluded from the literature.
- Evident from the text: the paper’s conclusions for Phases III and IV are largely prospective, because it says there is “as yet no comprehensive ex post evidence” for those phases.
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Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 12 Not valid · 106 Not checked · 92 Own results and interpretations
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“Empirical studies of the refining industry show PTRs of about 100%, i.e. full cost pass-through (Alexeeva-Talebi, Citation2011; De Bruyn, Markowska, de Jong, & Bles, Citation2010; Oberndorfer et al., Citation2010).”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.3. Hypothesis no. 3: cost pass-through
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Alexeeva-Talebi, 2011 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites De Bruyn et al., 2010
- Disputedcites Oberndorfer et al., 2010 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Oberndorfer et al. (2010) do estimate pass-through rates empirically for the refining industry, but the summary table in the Conclusion (p. 41) reports 50 percent over five weeks for UK diesel and 75 percent over five weeks for UK gasoline — not ~100 percent; the only 100 percent estimate in the table is for UK LDPE, a chemical product, not refining. The Results/Diesel section (p. 22) likewise derives 'roughly 50% of energy price increases passed through' from a 0.27% diesel-price response to a 1% oil-price change. The Abstract (p. 7) and Conclusion (p. 43) state explicitly that the sectors 'are not capable to completely pass-through their costs into output prices, with the exception of ceramic goods', contradicting the attributed full pass-through for refining. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“In all, the EU ETS accounts for only 1% of the surge in low-carbon patenting, depicted in .”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.5. Hypothesis no. 5: innovation
What the sources say
- Disputedcites Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction, Results, and Discussion all estimate that the EU ETS accounts for roughly 2% of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting, not 1%. The paper’s separate estimate of less than a 1% increase in low-carbon patenting at the EPO uses a different denominator. (LLM, conf=0.93)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Disputed
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Calel and Dechezleprêtre (Citation2016) do not find evidence of the EU ETS causing spill-over effects on third parties’ patenting activity, implying a limited scope of innovation effects, so far.”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.5. Hypothesis no. 5: innovation
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016 source
The Introduction reports no compelling evidence of a net positive or negative effect on third parties’ patenting and says the EU ETS has so far had a very limited effect on the overall pace and direction of technological change. The Discussion likewise reports no compelling evidence of an indirect effect, while cautioning that its estimates are only indicative. (LLM, conf=0.94)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This percentage drops to 8.1% when extrapolating results to the whole non-matched sample of EU ETS firms, covering 80% of regulated emissions.”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.5. Hypothesis no. 5: innovation
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results section reports a 9.1% increase in low-carbon patenting when extrapolating to all 5,568 EU ETS firms, not 8.1%. The data-coverage discussion says those firms account for roughly 80% of EU ETS-wide regulated emissions. The extrapolation is to all identified EU ETS firms, including those in the matched sample, rather than to a wholly non-matched sample. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Moreover, the KfW/ZEW-CO2-Panel repeatedly reports very low shares of ETS firms whose abatement activities are driven by the goal of emissions reduction (Brockmann, Heindl, Löschel, Lutz, & Schumacher, Citation2012; Detken et al., Citation2009; Gallier, Lutz, Brockmann, & Dieckhöner, Citation2014, Citation2015; Löschel et al., Citation2010, Citation2011, Citation2013; Osberghaus, Heindl, Sommerf”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.6. Further hypotheses
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Brockmann et al., 2012
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Detken et al., 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites Gallier et al., 2014
Section 6 (Abatement) states that carbon emission reduction 'remains a side effect in most cases' and was the main reason for abatement-related interventions or investments for only ten per cent of the 2014 respondents, adding that 'this rate seems to have been constant over the last years'. Figure 13 (same section, sourced from the KfW/ZEW Barometer 2009-2014) documents the main-reason share at roughly 5-11 % per year for 2008-2013 versus 89-95 % side effect, which supports the 'repeatedly reports very low shares' framing. The Executive Summary repeats that emission reduction remains a side effect for most surveyed EU ETS-regulated German firms. (LLM, conf=0.90)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 105
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Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 2. Institutional background of the EU ETS
“Phase IV will run from 2021 to 2030.”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.2. Hypothesis no. 2: over-allocation
“According to projections by the European Environment Agency, the MSR will not be able to absorb the surplus before 2029, i.e. the end of Phase IV.”
Citations
Cites
Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship
Porter, M. E., & Linde, C. V. D. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.4.97 · Cited by 13,365
The Environment and Directed Technical Change
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Bursztyn, L., & Hemous, D. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.131 · Cited by 3,734
Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel Data Study
Jaffe, A. B., & Palmer, K. (1997) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465397557196 · Cited by 2,181 · cited 1×
“There is a large amount of literature on the innovation effects of environmental policies in general (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, & Hemous, 2012; Ambec et al., 2013; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Gagelmann & Frondel, 2005; Hamamoto, 2006; Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; for a review see Popp, 2010).”
BackgroundThe Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?
Ambec, S., Cohen, M. A., Elgie, S., & Lanoie, P. (2013) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1093/reep/res016 · Cited by 1,928 · cited 2×
“There is a large amount of literature on the innovation effects of environmental policies in general (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, & Hemous, 2012; Ambec et al., 2013; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Gagelmann & Frondel, 2005; Hamamoto, 2006; Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; for a review see Popp, 2010). For the EU ETS in particular,…”
BackgroundInduced Innovation and Energy Prices
(1998) · Cited by 1,717
Determinants of environmental innovation in US manufacturing industries
Brunnermeier, S. B., & Cohen, M. A. (2003) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00058-x · Cited by 1,586 · cited 1×
“There is a large amount of literature on the innovation effects of environmental policies in general (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, & Hemous, 2012; Ambec et al., 2013; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Gagelmann & Frondel, 2005; Hamamoto, 2006; Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; for a review see Popp, 2010).”
BackgroundPorter, M. E. (1991) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0491-168 · Cited by 1,540
Trade, the pollution haven hypothesis and the environmental Kuznets curve: examining the linkages
Cole, M. A. (2004) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2003.09.007 · Cited by 1,324 · cited 3×
“see Cole, 2004; Eskeland & Harrison, 2003; Kozluk & Timiliotis, 2016; Millimet & Roy, 2011; Wagner & Timmins, 2008; Yoon & Heshmati, 2017). In the case of the EU ETS, the PHH is supported if significant evidence of carbon leakage attributable to the EU ETS is established. If firms were to start emitting more once relo…”
BackgroundMethodMoving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis
Eskeland, G. S., & Harrison, A. E. (2003) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(02)00084-6 · Cited by 1,237
Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evidence from the European Carbon Market
Calel, R., & Dechezleprêtre, A. (2016) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00470 · Cited by 1,147 · cited 5×
“Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) do not find evidence of the EU ETS causing spill-over effects on third parties’ patenting activity, implying a limited scope of innovation effects, so far.”
BackgroundInfluential
Research works printed but not linked: 18
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Cited by
The effectiveness of China’s regional carbon market pilots in reducing firm emissions
Cui, J., Wang, C., Zhang, J., & Zheng, Y. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2109912118 · Cited by 349
“The empirical evidence from the European Union and the United States shows that ETS is effective in mitigating climate change (9–14), but the economic consequences are mixed (15–22).”
A hybrid model for carbon price forecasting using GARCH and long short-term memory network
Huang, Y., Dai, X., Wang, Q., & Zhou, D. (2021) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.116485 · Cited by 314
Vona, F. (2019) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2018.1532871 · Cited by 159
Verde, S. F. (2020) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12356 · Cited by 142
Feng, Y., Wang, X., Liang, Z., Hu, S., Xie, Y., & Wu, G. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126262 · Cited by 137
Metadata
- Authors
- Joltreau, E., & Sommerfeld, K.
- Affiliations
- Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (FR)
- Centre for European Economic Research (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Sommerfeld, Katrin
- ORCID
- Joltreau, Eugénie
- Venue
- Climate Policy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2018-07-26
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 453-471
- ISSN
- 1469-3062 (ISSN-L)
- 1752-7457
- OpenAlex
- W2884154095
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 104
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 17.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Climate Policy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Centre for European Economic Research
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Social Sciences › Law › EU Law and Policy Analysis
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
- Keywords
- EU Emissions Trading System, emissions trading, enterprise competitiveness, profitability, cost pass-through, windfall profits, innovation impact, energy costs, manufacturing industry
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