The DOI matches its Crossref record; 104 of the 106 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 137 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms' competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature
Open accessAbstract
Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms’ competitiveness or profitability. For the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) the empirical literature documents that significant emissions reductions have resulted from it. Surprisingly, however, the literature shows that there have been hardly any concurrent negative effects on firms’ competitiveness during the first two phases of the scheme (2005–2012). We show that the main explanations for the absence of negative impacts on competitiveness are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may have limited the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. Several factors suggest that over-allocation is likely to remain substantial in the upcoming periods of the scheme. Therefore, we expect to see no negative competitiveness effects from the EU ETS in Phases III and IV (2013–2030).Key policy insights Empirical literature on the EU ETS shows that there have been hardly any effects on firms’ competitiveness or profitability.One main explanation is a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop. This reduced incentives for innovation.Moreover, firms were able to pass costs on to consumers in some sectors which partly generated windfall profits.Innovation effects have so far been small but positive.We expect to see no negative competitiveness effects on regulated firms in the near future suggesting that no further reliefs for regulated firms are required.
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## TL;DR
This paper is a literature-based explanation for why the EU ETS had little to no negative effect on firms’ competitiveness in Phases I–II. It argues that free allocation, over-allocation, cost pass-through, low energy cost shares, and limited but positive innovation effects together offset the expected cost burden.
## Key findings
- The empirical literature reviewed in the paper finds “hardly any” negative competitiveness or profitability effects for EU ETS-regulated firms during Phases I and II; the paper says there is “no significant negative effects” on firm-level competitiveness.
- In Phase I, auctioning was very limited: the European Commission allowed member states to auction a maximum of 5% of allowances in Phase I and up to 10% in Phase II, while auctioning accounted for an annual average of 0.13% of certified emissions in Phase I.
- The paper reports a surplus of 95 million tonnes CO2 in 2005, equal to 4.5% of allocated allowances, and later says Phase III still had a surplus of 1.7 billion permits, “almost one year of EU ETS emissions.”
- Cost pass-through was substantial in some sectors: the paper cites empirical pass-through rates of 80% in Spain (2004–2006), 60%–117% in Germany, and 64%–81% in the Netherlands for electricity, and notes refining industry pass-through of about 100%.
- Energy costs were relatively small on average: the European Commission estimate cited in the paper puts energy costs at 4.6% of total production in the EU-27 in 2011; for manufacturing value added, it cites about 10%.
- Innovation effects exist but are modest: the paper reports that Calel and Dechezleprêtre found the EU ETS boosted low-carbon patenting by 36.2% among matched regulated firms, but only 8.1% when extrapolated to the full non-matched sample, and that the EU ETS accounted for only 1% of the overall surge in low-carbon patenting.
## Methods
- The paper is a narrative literature review / synthesis of ex post empirical studies on the EU ETS, focused on firm-level competitiveness rather than country-level effects.
- It organizes the evidence around five hypotheses for the zero competitiveness effect: free allocation, over-allocation, cost pass-through, low energy-cost shares, and innovation.
- The main analysis is comparative and explanatory: it collects and interprets findings from prior empirical papers, reports sectoral and country examples, and links them to EU ETS design features across Phases I–IV.
## Limitations
- The paper itself states it is limited to competitiveness at the firm level, excluding the country-level perspective; it also says indirect effects such as through electricity prices are covered only briefly, and it is not a full cost–benefit analysis.
- The paper notes that for several channels—especially carbon leakage, firm closure, and between-markets relocation—there is “a lack of research” or “scarce evidence,” which limits what can be concluded from the literature.
- Evident from the text: the paper’s conclusions for Phases III and IV are largely prospective, because it says there is “as yet no comprehensive ex post evidence” for those phases.
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Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 12 Not valid · 106 Not checked · 92 Own results and interpretations
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“Empirical studies of the refining industry show PTRs of about 100%, i.e. full cost pass-through (Alexeeva-Talebi, Citation2011; De Bruyn, Markowska, de Jong, & Bles, Citation2010; Oberndorfer et al., Citation2010).”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.3. Hypothesis no. 3: cost pass-through
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Alexeeva-Talebi, 2011 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites De Bruyn et al., 2010
- Disputedcites Oberndorfer et al., 2010 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Oberndorfer et al. (2010) do estimate pass-through rates empirically for the refining industry, but the summary table in the Conclusion (p. 41) reports 50 percent over five weeks for UK diesel and 75 percent over five weeks for UK gasoline — not ~100 percent; the only 100 percent estimate in the table is for UK LDPE, a chemical product, not refining. The Results/Diesel section (p. 22) likewise derives 'roughly 50% of energy price increases passed through' from a 0.27% diesel-price response to a 1% oil-price change. The Abstract (p. 7) and Conclusion (p. 43) state explicitly that the sectors 'are not capable to completely pass-through their costs into output prices, with the exception of ceramic goods', contradicting the attributed full pass-through for refining. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“In all, the EU ETS accounts for only 1% of the surge in low-carbon patenting, depicted in .”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.5. Hypothesis no. 5: innovation
What the sources say
- Disputedcites Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction, Results, and Discussion all estimate that the EU ETS accounts for roughly 2% of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting, not 1%. The paper’s separate estimate of less than a 1% increase in low-carbon patenting at the EPO uses a different denominator. (LLM, conf=0.93)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Disputed
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Calel and Dechezleprêtre (Citation2016) do not find evidence of the EU ETS causing spill-over effects on third parties’ patenting activity, implying a limited scope of innovation effects, so far.”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.5. Hypothesis no. 5: innovation
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016 source
The Introduction reports no compelling evidence of a net positive or negative effect on third parties’ patenting and says the EU ETS has so far had a very limited effect on the overall pace and direction of technological change. The Discussion likewise reports no compelling evidence of an indirect effect, while cautioning that its estimates are only indicative. (LLM, conf=0.94)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This percentage drops to 8.1% when extrapolating results to the whole non-matched sample of EU ETS firms, covering 80% of regulated emissions.”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.5. Hypothesis no. 5: innovation
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results section reports a 9.1% increase in low-carbon patenting when extrapolating to all 5,568 EU ETS firms, not 8.1%. The data-coverage discussion says those firms account for roughly 80% of EU ETS-wide regulated emissions. The extrapolation is to all identified EU ETS firms, including those in the matched sample, rather than to a wholly non-matched sample. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Moreover, the KfW/ZEW-CO2-Panel repeatedly reports very low shares of ETS firms whose abatement activities are driven by the goal of emissions reduction (Brockmann, Heindl, Löschel, Lutz, & Schumacher, Citation2012; Detken et al., Citation2009; Gallier, Lutz, Brockmann, & Dieckhöner, Citation2014, Citation2015; Löschel et al., Citation2010, Citation2011, Citation2013; Osberghaus, Heindl, Sommerf”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.6. Further hypotheses
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Brockmann et al., 2012
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Detken et al., 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites Gallier et al., 2014
Section 6 (Abatement) states that carbon emission reduction 'remains a side effect in most cases' and was the main reason for abatement-related interventions or investments for only ten per cent of the 2014 respondents, adding that 'this rate seems to have been constant over the last years'. Figure 13 (same section, sourced from the KfW/ZEW Barometer 2009-2014) documents the main-reason share at roughly 5-11 % per year for 2008-2013 versus 89-95 % side effect, which supports the 'repeatedly reports very low shares' framing. The Executive Summary repeats that emission reduction remains a side effect for most surveyed EU ETS-regulated German firms. (LLM, conf=0.90)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
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Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 2. Institutional background of the EU ETS
“Phase IV will run from 2021 to 2030.”
§ 3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects of the EU ETS > 4.2. Hypothesis no. 2: over-allocation
“According to projections by the European Environment Agency, the MSR will not be able to absorb the surplus before 2029, i.e. the end of Phase IV.”
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“In parallel, emissions trading has distributional effects such that certain firms or sectors may benefit while others may face additional challenges (Flues & Thomas, 2015).”
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Martin, R., Muûls, M., de Preux, L., & Wagner, U. J. (2014) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.05.010 · Cited by 167 · cited 1×
“Martin et al. (2014a) show that for most firms, the propensity to relocate does not fluctuate with the amount of free certificates.”
BackgroundBranger, F., Quirion, P., & Chevallier, J. (2016) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/01956574.37.3.fbra · Cited by 155
Endogenizing technological change: Matching empirical evidence to modeling needs
Pizer, W. A., & Popp, D. (2008) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2008.02.006 · Cited by 149 · cited 2×
“adopt a wait-and-see strategy, that is, prudent investment behaviour (Pontoglio, 2010). Borghesi, Cainelli, and Mazzanti (2012), and Löfgren et al.”
BackgroundAddressing leakage in the EU ETS: Border adjustment or output-based allocation?
Monjon, S., & Quirion, P. (2011) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.04.020 · Cited by 145 · cited 2×
“This is because a zeroeffectmay come as a surprise given that special interest groups were highly concerned about employment losses and other negative competitiveness effects (Hanoteau, 2014; Monjon & Quirion, 2011).”
BackgroundThe Impact Of Carbon Trading On Industry: Evidence From German Manufacturing Firms
Wagner, U. J., Rehdanz, K., & Petrick, S. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2389800 · Cited by 140 · cited 10×
“Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) point out that low-carbon solutions were developed at an early stage.”
BackgroundInfluentialSwiss residential demand for electricity
Filippini, M. (1999) · Applied Economics Letters · doi:10.1080/135048599352880 · Cited by 134 · cited 1×
“Second, demand for electricity is highly price inelastic, with even lower price elasticity for households than for industry (Fan & Hyndman, 2011; Filippini, 1999; Filippini & Pachauri, 2004).”
BackgroundEngels, A. (2009) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2008.08.005 · Cited by 128 · cited 1×
“However, firms themselves are often unaware of their abatement costs (Engels, 2009; also see Martin et al., 2016).”
BackgroundA literature-based multi-criteria evaluation of the EU ETS
Venmans, F. (2012) · Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.rser.2012.05.036 · Cited by 106 · cited 3×
“However, there appears to be no significant negative effects of the EU ETS on firm-level competitiveness during Phase I and II as documented by the empirical ex post literature (Arlinghaus, 2015; Martin et al., 2016; Venmans, 2012).”
BackgroundClò, S. (2010) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.12.035 · Cited by 106 · cited 2×
“Three types of costs associated with emissions trading can be distinguished (following Clò, 2010): abatement costs,6 the costs of buying emission allowances, and potentially higher electricity prices.”
BackgroundSijm, J., Chen, Y., & Hobbs, B. F. (2011) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2011.10.002 · Cited by 106
Climate Policy & Corporate Behavior
Commins, N., Lyons, S., Schiffbauer, M., & Tol, R. S. J. (2011) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol32-no4-4 · Cited by 105
Transaction costs for firms in the EU ETS: lessons from Ireland
JARAITĖ, J., CONVERY, F., & DI MARIA, C. (2010) · Climate Policy · doi:10.3763/cpol.2009.0659 · Cited by 99
Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU emissions trading scheme
Schleich, J., Rogge, K., & Betz, R. (2009) · Energy Efficiency · doi:10.1007/s12053-008-9029-3 · Cited by 95
Allowance allocation in the European emissions trading system: a commentary
Grubb, M. J., Azar, C., & Persson, U. M. (2005) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2005.9685545 · Cited by 87
Borghesi, S., Franco, C., & Marin, G. (2020) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12323 · Cited by 86
EU-ETS Phase IV: allowance prices, design choices and the market stability reserve
Perino, G., & Willner, M. (2017) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2017.1360173 · Cited by 84 · cited 1×
“Also, Perino and Willner (2017) argue that postponing permit auction using the MSR only increases short-term scarcity but lowers long-term prices.”
BackgroundStringency and distribution in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: first evidence
Kettner, C., Köppl, A., Schleicher, S., & Thenius, G. (2008) · Climate Policy · doi:10.3763/cpol.2007.0394 · Cited by 82 · cited 3×
“provided a short allocation of EUAs to the power sector because it was hardly trade-exposed and governments believed that potential abatement was larger (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007; Kettner et al., 2008).”
BackgroundMethodImplications of announced phase II national allocation plans for the EU ETS
Neuhoff, K., Åhman, M., Betz, R., Cludius, J., Ferrario, F., Holmgren, K., Pál, G., Grubb, M., Matthes, F., Rogge, K. S., et al. (2006) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2006.9685610 · Cited by 78 · cited 1×
“Moreover, free allocation is often referred to as a subsidy in the literature (Böhringer & Lange, 2005; Jegou & Rubini, 2011; Neuhoff et al., 2006).”
BackgroundWhy the EU ETS needs reforming: an empirical analysis of the impact on company investments
Löfgren, Å., Wråke, M., Hagberg, T., & Roth, S. (2013) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2014.864800 · Cited by 75 · cited 1×
“Borghesi, Cainelli, and Mazzanti (2012), and Löfgren et al. (2014) for Swedish industry, conclude that the scheme was not strict”
BackgroundThe impact of emission trading on innovation - science fiction or reality?
Gagelmann, F., & Frondel, M. (2005) · European Environment · doi:10.1002/eet.387 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“There is a large amount of literature on the innovation effects of environmental policies in general (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, & Hemous, 2012; Ambec et al., 2013; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Gagelmann & Frondel, 2005; Hamamoto, 2006; Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; for a review see Popp, 2010).”
BackgroundCost Pass-Through of the EU Emissions Allowances: Examining the European Petroleum Markets
Alexeeva-Talebi, V. (2011) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2011.07.029 · Cited by 68
Do environmental regulations affect FDI decisions? The pollution haven hypothesis revisited
Yoon, H., & Heshmati, A. (2020) · Science and Public Policy · doi:10.1093/scipol/scaa060 · Cited by 60
Boutabba, M. A., & Lardic, S. (2016) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10479-016-2246-9 · Cited by 55
An Analysis of Allowance Banking in the EU ETSPreprint
Ellerman, A. D., Valero, V., & Zaklan, A. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2631964 · Cited by 52
Does emission permit allocation affect CO2 cost pass-through? A theoretical analysis
Wang, M., & Zhou, P. (2017) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2017.06.011 · Cited by 46 · cited 1×
“However, Wang and Zhou (2017) show theoretically that benchmarking would allow lower pass-through rates (PTRs) than other allocation methods.”
BackgroundThe impact of administrative transaction costs in the EU emissions trading system
Heindl, P. (2015) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1110108 · Cited by 44
Impacts of Carbon Prices on Indicators of Competitiveness: A Review of Empirical Findings
(2015) · OECD Environment Working Papers · doi:10.1787/5js37p21grzq-en · Cited by 41 · cited 5×
“More details on the competitiveness and other firm-level effects of environmental policies can also be found in Venmans (2012), Arlinghaus (2015) and Martin et al. (2016).”
BackgroundInfluentialBetz, R. A., & Schmidt, T. S. (2016) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1028319 · Cited by 40
Assessing the impact of the EU ETS using firm level data. Bruegel Working Paper 2011/08, July 2011
Zachmann, G., Faye, A. N., & Abrell, J. (2011) · Archive of European Integration (AEI) (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 40
The Interaction of Emissions Trading and Renewable Energy PromotionPreprint
Abrell, J., & Weigt, H. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1317310 · Cited by 40 · cited 1×
“These additional efforts outside the EU ETS could cause ‘over-abatement’ and thus over-allocation (see Abrell & Weigt, 2008; Vailles et al., 2017).”
BackgroundNason, G. (2016) · Reference Reviews · doi:10.1108/rr-01-2016-0012 · Cited by 36
Carbon Leakage in the Primary Aluminium Sector: What Evidence after 6.5 Years of the EU ETS?
Sartor, O. (2013) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2205516 · Cited by 35 · cited 2×
“Several trade flow analyses show that the carbon price level did not lead to any significant carbon leakage in the European primary aluminium sector (Sartor, 2012), in the cement and steel sectors (Boutabba & Lardic, 2017; Branger, Quirion, & Chevallier, 2017) or in manufacturing sectors(11) (Naegele & Zaklan, 2017).”
BackgroundMäler, K.-G. (2013) · doi:10.4324/9781315064123 · Cited by 34
Technological Change and the EU ETS: The Case of Ireland
Anderson, B., Convery, F., & Di Maria, C. (2011) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1855495 · Cited by 33
Environmental Efficiency, Innovation and Economic Performances
Montini, A., & Mazzanti, M. (2010) · doi:10.4324/9780203850411 · Cited by 32
Environmental regulations and labor markets
Deschênes, O. (2014) · IZA World of Labor · doi:10.15185/izawol.22 · Cited by 30 · cited 1×
“In theory, a cap-and-trade system imposes extra costs on firms (e.g. Deschenes, 2014).”
BackgroundFree allocation in the 3rd EU ETS period: assessing two manufacturing sectors
Stenqvist, C., & Åhman, M. (2014) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2014.979130 · Cited by 28 · cited 1×
“Also, while the new benchmark rules of the period were meant to reduce the allocations, it is argued that at least for some very heterogeneous sectors (e.g. pulp and paper industry; Stenqvist & Åhman, 2016) over-allocation is likely to be intensified due to benchmark misspecification.”
BackgroundDo Environmental Regulations Effect FDI Decisions? The Pollution Haven Hypothesis RevisitedPreprint
Yoon, H., & Heshmati, A. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3010675 · Cited by 28
Environmental regulations and business decisions
Gray, W. B. (2015) · IZA World of Labor · doi:10.15185/izawol.187 · Cited by 25 · cited 1×
“E.g., firms may buy new equipment to adopt an eco-friendly production process and to control their level of pollution (Gray, 2015).”
BackgroundEuropean Climate Policy and Industrial Relocation: Evidence from German Multinational FirmsPreprint
Koch, N. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2868283 · Cited by 24
The Allocation of Emission Allowances Free of Charge: Legal and Economic Considerations
Jégou, I., & Rubini, L. (2011) · doi:10.7215/co_ip_20110826 · Cited by 21 · cited 1×
“Moreover, free allocation is often referred to as a subsidy in the literature (Böhringer & Lange, 2005; Jegou & Rubini, 2011; Neuhoff et al., 2006).”
Background(2010) · OSTI OAI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information) · Cited by 21
Understanding the Competitiveness Implications of Future Phases of EU ETS on the Industrial Sectors
Oberndorfer, U., Alexeeva-Talebi, V., & Löschel, A. (2010) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1649445 · Cited by 21 · cited 3×
“Oberndorfer et al. (2010) find PTRs of 50% (ammonium nitrate) and 100% (low density polyethylene), using data from the UK, and wider European data when available.”
BackgroundMethodCost Pass-Through in Strategic Oligopoly: Sectoral Evidence for the EU ETS
Alexeeva-Talebi, V. (2011) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1674850 · Cited by 19 · cited 9×
“If firms cannot pass-through the costs of the EU ETS, they may have to decrease profit margins or may decide to exit the market and / or relocate (Alexeeva-Talebi, 2010). However, the literature shows no negative effect on competitiveness and we find no evidence of carbon leakage (see section 4.6). These negative effe…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Impacts of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme on Competitiveness in EuropePreprint
Rennings, K., & Oberndorfer, U. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.920406 · Cited by 18 · cited 2×
“There may be a first mover advantage for ‘green’ technologies (Beise & Rennings, 2005; Fankhauser et al., 2013; Oberndorfer & Rennings, 2006).”
BackgroundThe effect of regulatory scrutiny: Asymmetric cost pass-through in power wholesale and its end
Mokinski, F., & Wölfing, N. M. (2013) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/s11149-013-9233-8 · Cited by 14
Does the EU ETS Cause Carbon Leakage in European Manufacturing?Preprint
Naegele, H., & Zaklan, A. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3050323 · Cited by 14
Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe
Hanoteau, J. (2014) · Recherches économiques de Louvain · doi:10.1017/s0770451800002037 · Cited by 11 · cited 2×
“Why is it important tounderstandaphenomenon that displays a zero effect? This is because a zeroeffectmay come as a surprise given that special interest groups were highly concerned about employment losses and other negative competitiveness effects (Hanoteau, 2014; Monjon & Quirion, 2011).”
BackgroundAssessing the EU ETS with a bottom-up, multi-sector model
Pintos, P., & Linares, P. (2017) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2017.1294045 · Cited by 9
Löschel, A., Brockmann, K. L., Heindl, P., et al. (2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 8
Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe
Hanoteau, J. (2014) · Recherches économiques de Louvain · doi:10.3917/rel.801.0061 · Cited by 4
(2014) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 3
Osberghaus, D., Heindl, P., Sommerfeld, K., & Höfling, H. (2016) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 3
Self-citationDecentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy
Kruger, J. A., Oates, W., & Pizer, W. A. (2007) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1001437
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Cited by
The effectiveness of China’s regional carbon market pilots in reducing firm emissions
Cui, J., Wang, C., Zhang, J., & Zheng, Y. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2109912118 · Cited by 349
“The empirical evidence from the European Union and the United States shows that ETS is effective in mitigating climate change (9–14), but the economic consequences are mixed (15–22).”
A hybrid model for carbon price forecasting using GARCH and long short-term memory network
Huang, Y., Dai, X., Wang, Q., & Zhou, D. (2021) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.116485 · Cited by 314
Vona, F. (2019) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2018.1532871 · Cited by 159
Verde, S. F. (2020) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12356 · Cited by 142
Feng, Y., Wang, X., Liang, Z., Hu, S., Xie, Y., & Wu, G. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126262 · Cited by 137
Metadata
- Authors
- Joltreau, E., & Sommerfeld, K.
- Affiliations
- Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (FR)
- Centre for European Economic Research (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Sommerfeld, Katrin
- ORCID
- Joltreau, Eugénie
- Venue
- Climate Policy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2018-07-26
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 453-471
- ISSN
- 1469-3062 (ISSN-L)
- 1752-7457
- OpenAlex
- W2884154095
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 104
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 17.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Climate Policy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Centre for European Economic Research
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Social Sciences › Law › EU Law and Policy Analysis
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
- Keywords
- EU Emissions Trading System, emissions trading, enterprise competitiveness, profitability, cost pass-through, windfall profits, innovation impact, energy costs, manufacturing industry
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