Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.
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Citations
Cites
Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years of research
Rayner, K. (1998) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.124.3.372 · Cited by 7,979
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 3×
“The name extended mind thesis is the name originally given to a radical view in the philosophy of mind by its two earliest defenders, the prominent philosophers of mind Andy Clark and David Chalmers (Clark & Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundThe unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 1×
“Consider, for instance, the distinction often made between controlled and automatic processes ( Bargh & Chartrand 1999; Wegner 2005).”
BackgroundMcClelland, J. L., Rumelhart, D. E., & AU (1987) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5237.001.0001 · Cited by 3,315
Being there: putting brain, body, and world together again
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-6204 · Cited by 2,631
Failure to detect changes to people during a real-world interaction
Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (1998) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03208840 · Cited by 733 · cited 1×
“But extending one’s mind beyond the head is not something that only rare or damaged individuals do; it is not a second-best substitute for internal mental states and capacities.”
Background
Cited by
Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems
Heersmink, R. (2017) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-016-9802-1 · Cited by 43
Farina, M., & Lavazza, A. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00508-4 · Cited by 40
Moral Reasons Not to Posit Extended Cognitive Systems: a Reply to Farina and Lavazza
Cassinadri, G. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00560-0 · Cited by 14
“(Levy, 2007b: 220).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Levy, N.
- Venue
- The American Journal of Bioethics
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2007-09-14
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 3-11
- ISSN
- 1526-5161 (ISSN-L)
- 1536-0075
- OpenAlex
- W2002771475
- Cited by
- 91
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 1.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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