Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Can perceptual presence be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models linking perception and action? Considering an unusually rich range of responses to this idea has led me to (1) re-emphasize the core conceptual commitment of "predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies" (PPSMC) to predictive model-based perception, (2) reconsider the relationship between presence and objecthood, and (3) refine the phenomenological target by differentiating between perceptual presence and the phenomenology of absence-of-presence, or "phenomenal unreality." It turns out that this requires blue-sky thinking.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 2×
“In the guise of “predictive processing” (PP), this means that the brain continuously attempts to predict its sensory inputs using its own emerging models of their causes, with prediction errors being used to update these (generative) models and perceptual priors so as to minimize discrepancies (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2…”
MethodA sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126 · cited 2×
“First, it claims that counterfactuallyequipped active inference operationalizes the “enactive” concept of “mastery of sensorimotor contingencies” (SMCs) that is central in the sensorimotor theory of perception and consciousness (O’Regan, 2011; O’Regan & Noë, 2001).”
BackgroundMethodCanonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038 · Cited by 2,421 · cited 1×
“The potential neural and computational bases of PP are now being disclosed (Bastos et al., 2012; Summerfield & De Lange, 2014), and mathematical approaches to quantifying counterfactual richness can probably be worked out (Friston, 2014; Friston et al., 2012).”
BackgroundHohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914
The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?
Friston, K. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 · Cited by 1,831
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816 · cited 1×
“I have previously argued that predictive inference of the hidden (internal) causes of interoceptive signals underlies emotions and subjective feeling states (Seth, 2013, 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationAttention, uncertainty, and free-energy
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215 · Cited by 1,365
Expectation in perceptual decision making: neural and computational mechanisms
Summerfield, C., & de Lange, F. P. (2014) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3838 · Cited by 832
Gregory, R. L. (1980) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.1980.0090 · Cited by 789
Predictions not commands: Active inference in the motor system
Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-012-0475-5 · Cited by 765
Cited by
Allostatic Self-efficacy: A Metacognitive Theory of Dyshomeostasis-Induced Fatigue and Depression
Stephan, K. E., Manjaly, Z. M., Mathys, C. D., Weber, L. A. E., Paliwal, S., Gard, T., Tittgemeyer, M., Fleming, S. M., Haker, H., Seth, A. K., et al. (2016) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2016.00550 · Cited by 437
“This question has been addressed by several recent theories, usually with a focus either on the body (Seth et al., 2011; Seth, 2013, 2015a; FeldmanBarrett and Simmons, 2015) or its environment (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005).”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationBeing a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood
Seth, A. K., & Tsakiris, M. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.08.008 · Cited by 371
“When we perceive an object, we perceive it as having an external existence, with a ‘back and sides’ [54], as ‘really existing’ out there in the world [55, 56].”
Self-citationBayesian approaches to autism: Towards volatility, action, and behavior.
Palmer, C. J., Lawson, R. P., & Hohwy, J. (2017) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000097 · Cited by 307
The cybernetic Bayesian brain : from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies
Seth, A. K. (2015) · MIND Group · doi:10.25358/openscience-84 · Cited by 239
Self-citationA mathematical model of embodied consciousness.
Rudrauf, D., Bennequin, D., Granic, I., Landini, G., Friston, K., & Williford, K. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.05.032 · Cited by 118
Metadata
- Authors
- Seth, A. K.
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-04-07
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 111-117
- ISSN
- 1758-8928 (ISSN-L)
- 1758-8936
- OpenAlex
- W1996079551
- Cited by
- 53
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 2.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/17588928.2015.1026888
- The paper
- Seth, A. K. (2015). Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception. Cognitive Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2015.1026888
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.