The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951. The record of these changes and the problems that prompted them provides an unusual opportunity to study the forces at work in markets of this kind. The present paper begins with a brief history and then presents a game-theoretic analysis to explain the orderly operation and longevity of the current market, in contrast to the turmoil that characterized various earlier short-lived attempts to organize the market. An analysis is also given of some contemporary problems facing the market. A subsidiary theme of the paper concerns the history of ideas: the problems encountered in the organization of this market, and some of the solutions arrived at, anticipated the discussion of such issues in the literature of economics and game theory.
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“At this point, it was discovered that the original Admissions Algorithm placed married couples at a disadvantage in achieving an optimal placement as compared with their single peers [Roth 1984;1990].”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1984
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“One charges that the Admissions Algorithm systematically favors hospital programs over medical students in cases of conflict [Graettinger and Peranson 1981b;Roth 1984;Sudarshan and Zisook 1981;Williams et al. 1981].”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1984
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Citations
Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2312726 · Cited by 2,082
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
Kelso, A. S., & Crawford, V. P. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913392 · Cited by 1,307
National Resident Matching Program
Beran, R. L. (1999) · Gastroenterology · doi:10.1053/gast.1999.0029900509a · Cited by 1,127
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.7.4.617 · Cited by 895
Self-citationMachiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Dubins, L. E., & Freedman, D. A. (1981) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1981.11995301 · Cited by 654
Incentives in Public Decision-Making.
Hammond, P. J., Green, J. R., & Laffont, J.-J. (1980) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2231809 · Cited by 609
(1973) · RAND Corporation eBooks · doi:10.7249/r1056-1 · Cited by 584
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
Hylland, A., & Zeckhauser, R. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260757 · Cited by 549
Some remarks on the stable matching problem
Gale, D., & Sotomayor, M. (1985) · Discrete Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/0166-218x(85)90074-5 · Cited by 431
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- [7]7. Demange, Gabrielle, and Gale, David. "A Strategy-proof Allocation Mecha- nism for Two-sided Matching Markets." Mimeographed. Paper presented at the IMSSS-Economics workshop. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ., 1983.
- [13]13. Gillies, D. B. "Locations of Solutions." In Report of an Informal Conference on the Theo? of N-Person Games, edited by Harold W. Kuhn. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ., 1953. (a) -. "Some Theorems on N-Person Games." Ph.D. dissertation. Princeton Univ., 1953. (
- [34]34. Shapley, Lloyd S. "Open Questions." In Report of an Informal Conference on the Theory of N-Person Games, edited by Harold W. Kuhn. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ., 1953.
Cited by
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x · Cited by 1,678
Self-citationSocial Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action
Coleman, J. S. (1986) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228423 · Cited by 1,573
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.1.242 · Cited by 1,567
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Pittsburgh (US)
- Corresponding author
- Roth, Alvin E.
- ORCID
- Roth, Alvin E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1984-12
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 991-1016
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2131988597
- Cited by
- 1,219
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 62 · 2021: 52 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 54 · 2016: 59 · 2015: 59 · 2014: 55 · 2013: 57 · 2012: 37
- FWCI
- 20.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nrs.harvard.edu
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- medical interns, medical residents, labor market organization, graduate medical education, history of medical education, market design, history of economic thought
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