The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
Abstract
By applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis, I argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets. In particular, I show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal-agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions.
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Citations
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Cited by
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10481 · Cited by 3,101
Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
Goldman, A. I. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001 · Cited by 2,166
Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making
Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669334 · Cited by 1,421
A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics
North, D. C. (1990) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951692890002004001 · Cited by 1,372
Metadata
- Authors
- Wittman, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1989-12
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1395-1424
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2076664493
- Cited by
- 804
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 31.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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