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Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
Abstract
By applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis, I argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets. In particular, I show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal-agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wittman, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1989-12
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1395-1424
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2076664493
- Cited by
- 804
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 31.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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