The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986
Abstract
This paper treats the market for special-interest campaign contributions and political "favors" as a simple asset market. The model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables: the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives, the monetary value of the favors he has promised, and his probability of winning. Using data on open-seat races for the U.S. House of Representatives, I confront the model with a series of tests. Despite the starkness of the model, the results of these tests are highly supportive.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Snyder
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-12
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1195-1227
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2114078650
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 10.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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