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Cited by 280

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market

Puelz, Robert, Snow, Arthur·1994·Journal of Political Economy
DOI 10.1086/261930
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Abstract

The configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium-deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system. Using contractual data from a representative insurer, we estimate a reduced-form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage. The data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks.

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Metadata

Authors
Puelz, R., & Snow, A.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
1994-04
Volume
102
Issue
2
Pages
236-257
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/261930
OpenAlex
W2010277693
Cited by
280
References
18
FWCI
6.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261930
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Puelz, R., & Snow, A. (1994). Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261930

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.