The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
Abstract
We interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated-game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants. The merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes, secured merchants' property rights, and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness, contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period. We elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated-game theories that provide no role for formal organization.
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Citations
Cites
Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition
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Self-citationSocial Norms and Community Enforcement
Kandori, M. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297925 · Cited by 1,574 · cited 1×
“In theory, this kind of communication can be significant (Kandori 1992).”
BackgroundReputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders
Greif, A. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009475 · Cited by 1,420
Self-citationThe Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800
Paret, P., & Parker, G. (1989) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1906367 · Cited by 925
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1 · Cited by 665
Renegotiation in repeated games
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Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
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Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime
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The Trade of Medieval Europe: the North
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Cited by
Остром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002798042001001 · Cited by 1,784
POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONALISM: Explaining Durability and Change
Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J. M. (1999) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.441 · Cited by 1,411
Knowledge, strategy, and the theory of the firm
Liebeskind, J. P. (1996) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250171109 · Cited by 1,291
Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis
Aoki, M. (2002) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · doi:10.1628/0932456022975150 · Cited by 1,200
Metadata
- Authors
- Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1994-08
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 745-776
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2061565725
- Cited by
- 1,220
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 26.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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