The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes
Abstract
While it is widely believed by academics, politicians, and the popular press that incumbent members of Congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district, the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak. One explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays. Since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort, the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias. We address this estimation problem using instrumental variables. For each House district, we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district. Federal spending is affected by a large number of actors (e.g., governors, senators, mayors, and other House members in the state delegation), leading to positive correlations in federal spending across the House districts within states. However, federal spending outside of a district is unlikely to be strongly correlated with the strength of that district's electoral challenge. In contrast to previous studies, we find strong evidence that federal spending benefits congressional incumbents: an additional $100 per capita in spending is worth as much as 2 percent of the popular vote. The only category of federal spending that does not appear to yield electoral rewards is direct transfers to individuals.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
HEALY, A., & MALHOTRA, N. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990104 · Cited by 931
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E. (2006) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/507155 · Cited by 801
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/317686 · Cited by 765
Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212920 · Cited by 667
The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?
Anzia, S. F., & Berry, C. R. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00512.x · Cited by 468
Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India
Cole, S. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.1.1.219 · Cited by 441
De La O, A. L. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00617.x · Cited by 431
Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil
Samuels, D. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510366 · Cited by 416
The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942–2000
Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. M. (2002) · Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy · doi:10.1089/153312902760137578 · Cited by 403
Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis
Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2008) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9286-x · Cited by 391
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
BERRY, C. R., BURDEN, B. C., & HOWELL, W. G. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000377 · Cited by 377
When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil 2002–10
Zucco, C. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12026 · Cited by 352
Government Transfers and Political Support
Manacorda, M., Miguel, E., & Vigorito, A. (2011) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.3.3.1 · Cited by 326
Do voters demand responsive governments? Evidence from Indian disaster relief
Cole, S., Healy, A., & Werker, E. (2012) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.05.005 · Cited by 322
Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures*
Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. M. (2006) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00470.x · Cited by 313
GRIMMER, J., MESSING, S., & WESTWOOD, S. J. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000457 · Cited by 296
Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Silverman, B. S. (2006) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/508248 · Cited by 280
Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities
Johansson, E. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00148-7 · Cited by 263
Faye, M., & Niehaus, P. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3516 · Cited by 160
Bechtel, M. M., & Hainmueller, J. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00533.x · Cited by 63
Metadata
- Authors
- Levitt, S. D., & Snyder
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-02
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 30-53
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1966813378
- Cited by
- 367
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.