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Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox

Meehl, Paul E. · 1967 · Philosophy of Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Because physical theories typically predict numerical values, an improvement in experimental precision reduces the tolerance range and hence increases corroborability. In most psychological research, improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching ½ of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction. Hence the corroboration yielded by “success” is very weak, and becomes weaker with increased precision. “Statistical significance” plays a logical role in psychology precisely the reverse of its role in physics. This problem is worsened by certain unhealthy tendencies prevalent among psychologists, such as a premium placed on experimental “cuteness” and a free reliance upon ad hoc explanations to avoid refutation.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1086/288135

Cites

14 of 14 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Lykken, 1966, Reports from the Research Laboratories of the Department of Psychiatry, University of Minnesota. Report No. PR-66-9

Cited by

Items 601–700 of 1,001

Metadata

Authors
Meehl, P. E.
Corresponding author
Meehl, Paul E.
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Published
1967-06
Volume
34
Issue
2
Pages
103-115
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
OpenAlex
W1963603753
Cited by
962
References
14
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 39 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 55 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 28 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 22
FWCI
15.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
Keywords
theory testing, corroboration, statistical significance, experimental precision, statistical power, prior probability, direction of effect, experimental design, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of physics

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Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.