The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox
Abstract
Because physical theories typically predict numerical values, an improvement in experimental precision reduces the tolerance range and hence increases corroborability. In most psychological research, improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching ½ of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction. Hence the corroboration yielded by “success” is very weak, and becomes weaker with increased precision. “Statistical significance” plays a logical role in psychology precisely the reverse of its role in physics. This problem is worsened by certain unhealthy tendencies prevalent among psychologists, such as a premium placed on experimental “cuteness” and a free reliance upon ad hoc explanations to avoid refutation.
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“According to Meehl (1967) and Peter (1981), correlations between constructs from the same sample are highly likely, if the sample is large and reliability is given (at least to some degree).”
From Development and Validation of a Basic Psychological Needs Scale for Technology Use (2024) · cites this paper as Meehl (1967)
In the citing paper
“Why? Such studies are cheap and can be farmed for significant results, especially when hypotheses only predict differences from the null, rather than precise quantitative differences and trends [3].”
From The natural selection of bad science (2016) · cites this paper as [3]
Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1970) · Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171434.009 · Cited by 4,649
Cohen, J. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.12.997 · Cited by 4,003
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
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Validation Guidelines for IS Positivist Research
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Ellis, P. D. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511761676 · Cited by 2,461
Metadata
- Authors
- Meehl, P. E.
- Corresponding author
- Meehl, Paul E.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1967-06
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 103-115
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1963603753
- Cited by
- 962
- References
- 14
- Citations by year
- 2026: 29 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 39 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 55 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 28 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 15.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- theory testing, corroboration, statistical significance, experimental precision, statistical power, prior probability, direction of effect, experimental design, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of physics
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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