The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in Insurance Markets
Abstract
We provide a foundation for a positive theory of insurance contracting with examples of its testable predictions. We argue that incentive conflicts arise when discretionary action is authorized and that contractual provisions and organizational structures control sources of conflict within the insurance market. Our emphasis differs from much of the previous insurance analysis. We focus on the implications of cost differences across insurance lines in the contracting/control technology. Our analysis yields testable implications about the distribution and contractual provisions (such as upper limits, deductibles, and coinsurance) and organizational structures (such as Lloyd's Associations, mutuals, and stocks) across lines of insurance.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827
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The choice of organizational form The case of franchising
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The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence
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On the Corporate Demand for Insurance
Mayers, D., & Smith, C. W. (1982) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_9 · Cited by 570
Self-citationSignalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy Choice
Morris, R. D. (1987) · Accounting and Business Research · doi:10.1080/00014788.1987.9729347 · Cited by 541
Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks
Jaffee, D. M., & Russell, T. (1997) · The Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.2307/253729 · Cited by 378
Comparison of Frontier Efficiency Methods: An Application to the U.S. Life Insurance Industry
Cummins, J. D., & Zi, H. (1998) · Journal of Productivity Analysis · doi:10.1023/a:1026402922367 · Cited by 320
Stock Versus Mutual Ownership Structures: The Risk Implications
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Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory
Jensen, M. C., & Smith, Jr. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.173461 · Cited by 284
Self-citationHedging and Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift Conversions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Mayers, D., & Smith, Jr.
- Venue
- The Journal of Business
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-01
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 407
- ISSN
- 0021-9398 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5374
- OpenAlex
- W2082475877
- Cited by
- 411
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 12.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.