The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent advances in the theory of the firm suggest an important role for the market for corporate control. Along with competition in the managerial labor market, various monitoring and bonding mechanisms, and managerial compensation schemes, competition for the right to determine or influence investment and financing decisions can play a role in disciplining a firm's managers or decision makers. Most notably, Manne (1965) and Fama (1978) view the market for corporate control as facilitating the allocation of corporate assets to their highest valued use. That is, tender offers, merger bids, and proxy contests enable outsiders to obtain control and capture gains from implementing an improved set of investment and financing decisions. Consequently, the theory of the corporation implies that the property rights associated with corporate control are valuable. Several previous studies have provided direct or indirect evidence on the value of control. These include Bradley (1980), Meeker and Joy (1980), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), Dodd and Warner
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Citations
Cites
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Manne, H. G. (1965) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259000 · Cited by 2,364
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
“Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983, 1984), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), and Zingales (1995) all show that, in the United States, shares with superior voting rights trade at a premium.”
BackgroundThe Theory of Capital Structure
HARRIS, M., & RAVIV, A. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x · Cited by 4,347
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x · Cited by 2,509
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105774431252 · Cited by 1,863
Metadata
- Authors
- Lease, R. C., McConnell, J. J., & Mikkelson, W. H.
- Venue
- The Journal of Business
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1984-01
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 443
- ISSN
- 0021-9398 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5374
- OpenAlex
- W2051550839
- Cited by
- 153
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 16.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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