The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rousseau’s Whale Hunt?: Coordination among Big‐Game Hunters
Abstract
In spite of its common use as a tool for examining cooperation, the prisoner’s dilemma game does not conform to the reality of many socio‐ecological contexts. Situations in which people engage in joint activities and maintain agreement in their preferences for outcomes are called “coordination games” by game theorists and “mutualism” by biologists. Coordination games are common, but cooperative outcomes are not always as easy to achieve as is generally believed. Data are presented from the village of Lamalera, Indonesia, where the economy revolves around traditional subsistence sperm‐whale hunting, that indicate a situation consistent with a coordination game. Return rates from cooperative whale hunting are greater per capita than those from solitary fishing. Coordination is maintained through complex norms that reduce transaction costs and provide assurances of satisfactory payoffs to participants. We speculate that cultural transmission of norms provides the “pregame” communication shown to be crucial for actors whose preference is to cooperate and achieve the synergistic payoffs common to coordination games such as big‐game hunting.
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Cited by
Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation: The Interdependence Hypothesis
Tomasello, M., Melis, A. P., Tennie, C., Wyman, E., & Herrmann, E. (2012) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/668207 · Cited by 738
“But Stag Hunt problems continue to present themselves, even in contemporary foraging populations: Alvard and Nolin (2002) show, for instance, that whale-hunting practices in the Lamelera of Indonesia conform well to such a payoff structure: an individual’s returns from a collaborative whale hunt…”
BackgroundA mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
To give and to give not: the behavioral ecology of human food transfers
Gurven, M. (2004) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000123 · Cited by 582
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Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and the Dynamics of Inequality in Small-Scale Societies
Mulder, M. B., Bowles, S., Hertz, T., Bell, A., Beise, J., Clark, G., Fazzio, I., Gurven, M., Hill, K., Hooper, P. L., et al. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1178336 · Cited by 491
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Alvard, M. S., & Nolin, D. A.
- Venue
- Current Anthropology
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-08
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 533-559
- ISSN
- 0011-3204 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5382
- OpenAlex
- W1529865627
- Cited by
- 207
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 24.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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