The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation
Abstract
Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Towards A Rigorous Science of Interpretable Machine Learning
Doshi-Velez, F., & Kim, B. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1702.08608 · Cited by 3,121
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What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences
Illari, P. M., & Williamson, J. (2012) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0038-2 · Cited by 551
Metadata
- Authors
- Glennan, S.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002-09
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- S3
- Pages
- S342-S353
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1994757764
- Cited by
- 867
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 157.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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