Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper defends a counterfactual account of explanation, according to which successful explanation requires tracing patterns of counterfactual dependence of a special sort, involving what I call active counterfactuals. Explanations having this feature must appeal to generalizations that are invariant—stable under certain sorts of changes. These ideas are illustrated by examples drawn from physics and econometrics.
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Citations
Cites
Causal diagrams for empirical research
PEARL, J. (1995) · Biometrika · doi:10.1093/biomet/82.4.669 · Cited by 2,355
Meek, C., & Glymour, C. (1994) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/45.4.1001 · Cited by 159
Cited by
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Self-citationMittelstadt, B., Russell, C., & Wachter, S. (2019) · Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3287560.3287574 · Cited by 794
“The explanations requested are thus not full scientific explanations, as they need not appeal to general relationships or scientific laws, but rather at most to causal relationships between the set of variables in a given model (Woodward, 1997).”
BackgroundBiological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism
Mitchell, S. D. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511802683 · Cited by 637
Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences
Woodward, J. (2000) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/51.2.197 · Cited by 380
Self-citationIndependence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition
Hausman, D. M., & Woodward, J. (1999) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/50.4.521 · Cited by 375
Self-citationPhilosophy of experimental biology
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-5262 · Cited by 360
Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics
Cartwright, N. (2007) · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511618758 · Cited by 335
Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account
Woodward, J., & Hitchcock, C. (2003) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00426 · Cited by 313
Self-citationCausation: One Word, Many Things
Cartwright, N. (2004) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/426771 · Cited by 301
Mitchell, S. D. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392774 · Cited by 267
Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth
Hitchcock, C., & Woodward, J. (2003) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00435 · Cited by 256
Self-citationAn Inferential Account of Model Explanation
Fang, W. (2019) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-018-9958-9 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Woodward, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1997
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- S4
- Pages
- S26-S41
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1988541692
- Cited by
- 156
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 15.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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