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Cited by 483Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy of Biology and Scientific ExplanationEmbodied and Extended Cognition

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States

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Bechtel, William, Mundale, Jennifer·1999·Philosophy of Science
DOI 10.1086/392683
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Abstract

The contention that psychological states are multiply realizable in different substrates has been used to support the contention that neuroscience is not likely to be very useful in guiding an understanding how cognition works. But in the context of scientific research, how seriously should we really take this threat of multiple realizability? By examining how brain areas are identified in neuroscience (where the approach is comparative and employs functional criteria), we show that the skepticism about neuroscience's role in understanding cognition is misguided and that the apparent success of multiple realizability is based on methodological error. With respect to the former point, we develop and analyze a representative case in which the organization of the brain provides crucial information about the organization of the cognitive system. Then we show that the initial plausibility of claims to multiple realizability rest on (a) mismatching a broad-grained criterion (to show sameness of psychological states) with a finegrained criterion (to differentiate brain states), and (b) a failure to attend to the purposes for which taxonomies of brain and psychological states are developed.

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Bechtel, Epistemology and Biology
  2. Marr, 1982, Vision
  3. Broca, 1861, Remarque sur le Siêge de la Faculté Suivies d'une Observation d' Aphémie, Bulletins de la Société Anatomique de Paris, 6, 343
  4. Henschen, 1903, La projection de la rétine sur la corticalité calcarine, La Semaine Médicale, 23, 125
  5. Zeki, 1993, A Vision of the Brain
  6. Gennari, 1782, De Peculiari Structura Cerebri Nonnullisque Eius Morbis
  7. Ingle, 1982, Analysis of Visual Behavior, 67

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Metadata

Authors
Bechtel, W., & Mundale, J.
Affiliations
  • Washington University in St. Louis (US)
  • University of Central Florida (US)
ORCID
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1999-06
Volume
66
Issue
2
Pages
175-207
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
DOI
10.1086/392683
OpenAlex
W2048737476
Cited by
483
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 12
FWCI
8.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 8340 d)
Locations
  • Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
  • Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
multiple realizability, cognitive neuroscience, brain states, psychological state, functional criteria, brain organization, methodological errors, philosophy of mind

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