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Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States
Open accessAbstract
The contention that psychological states are multiply realizable in different substrates has been used to support the contention that neuroscience is not likely to be very useful in guiding an understanding how cognition works. But in the context of scientific research, how seriously should we really take this threat of multiple realizability? By examining how brain areas are identified in neuroscience (where the approach is comparative and employs functional criteria), we show that the skepticism about neuroscience's role in understanding cognition is misguided and that the apparent success of multiple realizability is based on methodological error. With respect to the former point, we develop and analyze a representative case in which the organization of the brain provides crucial information about the organization of the cognitive system. Then we show that the initial plausibility of claims to multiple realizability rest on (a) mismatching a broad-grained criterion (to show sameness of psychological states) with a finegrained criterion (to differentiate brain states), and (b) a failure to attend to the purposes for which taxonomies of brain and psychological states are developed.
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“It is well known that any function can be implemented by di ff erent physical systems (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999; Fodor, 1974).”
From Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Bechtel & Mundale, 1999
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“This question is particularly difficult given the strong multiple realizability of many phenomena.2 It is well known that any function can be implemented by different physical systems (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999; Fodor, 1974).”
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“In other words, the process of inference affords a unique mapping between physical (neuronal) states and the properties (probabilistic beliefs) they realize (c.f., Bechtel and Mundale, 1999).”
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“Copes with the multiple realization argument (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999) which deals with the problem of understanding why some complex systems, such as human brains, are consciousness, whereas other complex systems, such as robots or mammalian immune systems, are presumed to be nonconscious.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bechtel, W., & Mundale, J.
- Affiliations
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- University of Central Florida (US)
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 175-207
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2048737476
- Cited by
- 483
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 8.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- multiple realizability, cognitive neuroscience, brain states, psychological state, functional criteria, brain organization, methodological errors, philosophy of mind
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