The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Models Are Used to Represent Reality
Abstract
Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms “law” and “theory,” I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form both hypotheses and generalizations.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Glennan, S. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779711.001.0001 · Cited by 603
The Curious Construct of Active Learning
Lombardi, D., Shipley, T. F., Astronomy Team, B. T., Bailey, J. M., Bretones, P. S., Prather, E. E., Ballen, C. J., Knight, J. K., Smith, M. K., Stowe, R. L., et al. (2021) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100620973974 · Cited by 381
Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation
Knuuttila, T. (2011) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.034 · Cited by 332
Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View
Parker, W. S. (2020) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/708691 · Cited by 310
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External representations and scientific understanding
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The Nature of Physical Computation
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An Inferential Account of Model Explanation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Giere, R. N.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-12
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 742-752
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2174159946
- Cited by
- 802
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 78.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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