The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling Theory, Strategic Interaction, and Symbolic Capital
Abstract
Signaling theory provides an opportunity to integrate an interactive theory of symbolic communication and social benefit with materialist theories of individual strategic action and adaptation. This article examines the potential explanatory value of signaling theory for a variety of anthropological topics, focusing on three social arenas in which signaling might plausibly be important: unconditional generosity, wasteful subsistence behavior, and artistic or craft traditions. In each case, it outlines the ways in which the phenomena correspond with the expectations of signaling theory by showing how a given pattern of action might signal particular hidden attributes, provide benefits to both signaler and observers, and meet the conditions for honest communication. The ethnographic evidence suggests that the fundamental conditions for reliable signaling of conditiondependent qualities may exist in many social domains. It appears that signaling theory has considerable promise for generating novel and powerful insights into the ethnographic realm.
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Citations
Cites
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The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Veblen, Bourdieu, and Conspicuous Consumption
Trigg, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2001.11506342 · Cited by 584
Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R. (2003) · Cross-Cultural Research · doi:10.1177/1069397103037002003 · Cited by 569
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Cited by
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310388419 · Cited by 6,735
Going green to be seen: status, reputation, and conspicuous conservation
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & Van den Bergh, B. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0017346 · Cited by 2,174
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
An evidence review of face masks against COVID-19
Howard, J., Huang, A., Li, Z., Tufekci, Z., Zdimal, V., van der Westhuizen, H.-M., von Delft, A., Price, A., Fridman, L., Tang, L.-H., et al. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2014564118 · Cited by 1,529
Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, F. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000069 · Cited by 522
Metadata
- Authors
- Bliege Bird, R., & Smith, E. A.
- Venue
- Current Anthropology
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2005-04
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 221-248
- ISSN
- 0011-3204 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5382
- OpenAlex
- W1573010155
- Cited by
- 907
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 70.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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