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Self‐Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism
Open accessAbstract
We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political "entry" is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the rival's welfare in the event of entry. Empirical evidence on releases of toxic chemicals shows that an increased threat of regulation (as proxied by increased membership in conservation groups) indeed induces firms to reduce toxic releases. We establish conditions under which self-regulation, if it occurs, is a Pareto improvement once costs of influencing policy are included.
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Reid, E. M., & Toffel, M. W. (2009) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.796 · Cited by 1,093
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Kim, E.-H., & Lyon, T. P. (2015) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2014.0949 · Cited by 932
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Kim, E.-H., & Lyon, T. P. (2011) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2010.11.001 · Cited by 322
Self-citationMcDonnell, M.-H., King, B. G., & Soule, S. A. (2015) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/0003122415581335 · Cited by 307
Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?
MALHOTRA, N., MONIN, B., & TOMZ, M. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000679 · Cited by 137
The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards
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(2012) · Cited by 39
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Retracted
Metadata
- Authors
- Maxwell, J. W., Lyon, T. P., & Hackett, S. C.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 583-618
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W3122102543
- Cited by
- 795
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 66.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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