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Cited by 280

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps

Open access
Angeletos, George‐Marios, Hellwig, Christian, Pavan, Alessandro·2006·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self‐fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy. This result does not rely on the freedom to choose out‐of‐equilibrium beliefs, nor on the policy being a public signal; it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise.

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Metadata

Authors
Angeletos, G., Hellwig, C., & Pavan, A.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
2006-06
Volume
114
Issue
3
Pages
452-484
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W1787709854
Cited by
280
References
21
FWCI
15.83
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/504901
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Angeletos, G., Hellwig, C., & Pavan, A. (2006). Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/504901

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.