The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze whether International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality is exclusively designed to be in line with observable economic indicators or whether it is partly driven by the IMF's major shareholder, the United States. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent from 38 countries, submitted during the period April 1997 through February 2003, revealed that the number of conditions on an IMF loan depended on a borrowing country’s voting pattern in the UN General Assembly. Closer allies of the United States (and other Group of 7 [G7] countries) received IMF loans with fewer conditions, especially prior to elections. These results are relevant to current public policy debates on the role and process of setting IMF loan conditions and provide broader insight into the influence of the United States and other G7 countries on international institutions.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Scope of IMF Conditionality
Stone, R. W. (2008) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818308080211 · Cited by 449
Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council
Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2009) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.03.002 · Cited by 441
Self-citationThe political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements
Kilby, C. (2009) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.014 · Cited by 306
How Robust Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems They Do Not Fix, and What to Do About It
King, G., & Roberts, M. E. (2015) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpu015 · Cited by 299
Faye, M., & Niehaus, P. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3516 · Cited by 160
Metadata
- Authors
- Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2007-02
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 105-124
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W2111327927
- Cited by
- 318
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 22.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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