Cultural Transmission Can Inhibit the Evolution of Altruistic Helping
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The study of culturally inherited traits has led to the suggestion that the evolution of helping behaviors is more likely with cultural transmission than without. Here we evaluate this idea through a comparative analysis of selection on helping under both genetic and cultural inheritance. We develop two simple models for the evolution of helping through cultural group selection: one in which selection on the trait depends solely on Darwinian fitness effects and one in which selection is driven by nonreproductive factors, specifically imitation of strategies achieving higher payoffs. We show that when cultural variants affect Darwinian fitness, the selection pressure on helping can be markedly increased relative to that under genetic transmission. By contrast, when variants are driven by nonreproductive factors, the selection pressure on helping may be reduced relative to that under genetic inheritance. This occurs because, unlike biological offspring, the spread of cultural variants from one group to another through imitation does not reduce the number of these variants in the source group. As a consequence, there is increased within-group competition associated with traits increasing group productivity, which reduces the benefits of helping. In these cases, selection for harming behavior (decreasing the payoff to neighbors) may occur rather than selection for helping.
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Citations
Cites
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“…without reproductive effects in nonhuman species, evidence of social comparison abounds in the human lineage (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Fliessbach et al. 2007) and is frequently used in assumptions used to construct models of economic agents (e.g., Ellison 1993; Kandori et al. 1993; Young 1993).”
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
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Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection.
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The evolution of altruistic punishment
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BackgroundGroup beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
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Beyond DNA: integrating inclusive inheritance into an extended theory of evolution
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Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans
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What traits are carried on mobile genetic elements, and why?
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Cultural Evolution: A Review of Theory, Findings and Controversies
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Débarre, F. (2020) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-019-00326-y · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Lehmann, L., Feldman, M. W., & Foster, K. R.
- Venue
- The American Naturalist
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2008-07
- Volume
- 172
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 12-24
- ISSN
- 0003-0147 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5323
- OpenAlex
- W1997417232
- Cited by
- 84
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 19.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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