The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons, which are the instruments of predation, and fortifications, which provide defense against predation. The analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. The analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium, in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure. We also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property. We find, for example, that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property.
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Citations
Cites
A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections
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Self-citationEconomic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges
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Self-citationSabotage in contests: a survey
Chowdhury, S. M., & Gürtler, O. (2015) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-015-0264-9 · Cited by 149
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Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, H. I., & Kim, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1995-12
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1275-1288
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2026537342
- Cited by
- 620
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 16.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.