The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons, which are the instruments of predation, and fortifications, which provide defense against predation. The analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. The analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium, in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure. We also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property. We find, for example, that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property.
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Citations
Cites
A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections
Grossman, H. I. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 808
Self-citationHirshleifer, J. (1991) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00046.x · Cited by 505
Powell, R. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938960 · Cited by 261
The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights
de Meza, D., & Gould, J. R. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261829 · Cited by 194
Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium
Garfinkel, M. R. (1990) · American Economic Review · Cited by 189
Conflict, War, and Redistribution
Brito, D. L., & Intriligator, M. D. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956242 · Cited by 183
Grossman, H. I., & Kim, M. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619984.004 · Cited by 64
Self-citation
Cited by
Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · Cited by 1,187
Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation
Anderson, J. E., & Marcouiller, D. (2002) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465302317411587 · Cited by 1,037
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
Acemoglu, D. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.003 · Cited by 666
Property Rights and Economic Development*
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00006-9 · Cited by 646
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, H. I., & Kim, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1995-12
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1275-1288
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2026537342
- Cited by
- 620
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 16.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.