The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India
Abstract
We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher performance pay program implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. At the end of 2 years of the program, students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.27 and 0.17 standard deviations in math and language tests, respectively. We find no evidence of any adverse consequences of the program. The program was highly cost effective, and incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value.
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Cites
Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement
Rivkin, S. G., Hanushek, E. A., & Kain, J. F. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00584.x · Cited by 4,501
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data
Rockoff, J. E. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041302244 · Cited by 2,432
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175
On the Specification and Estimation of the Production Function for Cognitive Achievement
Todd, P. E., & Wolpin, K. I. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00097 · Cited by 1,514
How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evidence from Project Star
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Hilger, N., Saez, E., Schanzenbach, D. W., & Yagan, D. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr041 · Cited by 1,514
Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India
Banerjee, A. V., Cole, S., Duflo, E., & Linden, L. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.3.1235 · Cited by 1,398
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
Jacob, B. A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.004 · Cited by 751
Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability
Neal, D., & Schanzenbach, D. W. (2010) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.2010.12318 · Cited by 460
Cited by
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
Oster, E. (2019) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711 · Cited by 5,367
Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School
Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. P. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.4.1241 · Cited by 928
Corruption in Developing Countries
Olken, B., & Pande, R. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17398 · Cited by 470
(2014) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) · Cited by 464
Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability
Neal, D., & Schanzenbach, D. W. (2010) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.2010.12318 · Cited by 460
Metadata
- Authors
- Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2011-02
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39-77
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2102409046
- Cited by
- 823
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 281.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
